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Introduction:
Despite some recent economic progress, there is still widespread poverty and
severe inequality in developing countries. According to the World Bank there are over
925 million hungry or undernourished people worldwide. More than 80 percent of people
in the world live in countries whose income inequality is rising. Over 2.1 billion people
globally live on less than two dollars a day, with over 880 million people facing absolute
poverty and living on less than one dollar a day. Three out of four people living on less
than $1 a day live in rural areas. These impacts have been magnified by the recent global
recession, as rising food prices and a decrease in remittances have pushed between 130
and 155 million people back into poverty. 1
Particularly in lower income countries, the impoverished are faced with poor and
insufficiently funded health care systems, restricted access to adequate nutrition and
potable water, low agricultural yields, and poor soil quality. Not only are the services in
short supply for the poor, but the predicament of the poor often limits their capacity to
avail themselves of these services. Parents may opt for keeping their children out of
school, either to employ their labor or to avoid the costs of transportation and school fees.
Healthcare may also entail costs that parents are reluctant to bear. Thus, people are often
in poor health which decreases their productivity and learning capacity. These issues
combined, along with inadequate education systems, poor school attendance, and teacher
absenteeism, all retard human capital accumulation.
These issues are exacerbated by inefficient and corrupt governments, poor
institutional development, and inadequate or nonexistent physical infrastructure. At the
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same time, geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and low aggregate levels of skilled
individuals often make impoverished areas unattractive to investors. Low skilled peoples
are often subject to poor labor conditions, and are often unprotected from labor market
upheavals. These interdependent factors work together to keep millions of people trapped
in vicious intergenerational cycles of poverty. Children often inherit the poverty of their
parents, and are increasingly marginalized from the global economy.
These conditions not only limit the quality of life for the impoverished, but in fact
impede the overall economic progress of developing countries. Having a large segment of
the population operating outside of the broader economy because of inadequate skill
development or poor access to financial markets results in many of the country’s
potential resources being unutilized. At the same time, negative social elements
associated with poverty, such as crime and slum communities, can intensify these
problems and impede the effectiveness of other factors. Recently, governments of
developing countries have attempted to address these complex problems by adopting
demand side social assistance programs specifically targeting human capital formation.
These programs condition cash transfers on certain behaviors of the recipients. Mexico
and Brazil were pioneers of these programs.
Brazil’s Bolsa Escola program emerged from a long history of local level
conditionality programs. Throughout the 1990’s many local community’s implemented
programs which had welfare transfers conditioned on school attendance. By 1998 there
were over 60 programs serving 200,000 families in Brazil, with some receiving matching
federal money. In 2001 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, encouraged by electoral
politics, issued an executive order uniting many of the local programs into a
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comprehensive national framework entitled the Bolsa Escola program.2 The program’s
design augmented existing municipal cash transfer policies, allowing local communities
to supplement and target national wealth transfer, while also establishing a uniform
framework for household targeting. 3
Mexico implemented a federal CCT program in 1997. Progresa, renamed
Oportunidades, was modeled on the Brazilian experience. The program provided cash
and in kind benefits to households conditional upon children regularly attending school
until the age of 18, and regular visits to health centers for the entire family.4 Originally
covering 300,000 households, it expanded to over 2.5 million by the year 2000.
Oportunidades aims to improve women’s position in society; it gives the cash transfer to
the female head of household and pays a 15 percent premium for girls to remain in
school.
The program targeted municipalities according to a marginal classification
scheme. It then used a socio-demographic study to determine which households would be
eligible for transfers. Finally, community feedback was incorporated to verify the initial
request should be accepted. By implementing standard mechanisms for determining
recipient’s eligibility, the program attempted to remove discretionary implementation that
had plagued previous assistance programs.
These programs started a global trend of creating programs which have benefits
based on recipients adhering to certain behavioral conditions. Conditional Cash Transfer
(CCTs) programs have become some of the largest forms of social assistance; Mexico’s
2
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program has grown from 300,000 to over 5 million households, while the Bolsa Familia
program has expanded to over 11 million families.5 In practice, CCTs have been a
relatively small part of government’s budgets; ranging from .08 percent of GDP for Chile
up to only 0.50 percent of GDP for Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico.6
Over the past decade conditional cash transfer programs have been adopted in
over a dozen countries.7 While the role and design of programs varies in each context,
generally these programs transfer cash to poor households provided they meet certain
behavioral criteria. Program’s conditions create financial incentives for people to invest
in developing their children’s human capital, while also aiming to reduce poverty through
wealth transfers. They generally target education, health, and malnutrition in youth,
almost always providing money to parents who send their children to school or have them
get regular doctors’ visits.
The specific nature of the program is dictated by the goals of the policymakers in
the particular country and the scope of the program. Some programs operate with the
goal of reducing the gender gap in education, like the Female Secondary School
Assistance Program in Bangladesh, or address high drop-out rates as in Indonesia
following the Asian financial crisis. Some programs provide block grants to
communities administered by local government or tribal officials; others are administered

5
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at the state or federal level, while others, such as Chile’s Solidario program, have families
setting their own goals in conjunction with social workers. 8
Indeed, there has been a parallel rise in conditions based social welfare programs
in developed countries. Programs such as the New Deal in the United Kingdom, the
Minimum d’Insertion in France, and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) in the United States all provide wealth transfers conditional on the recipients
exhibiting “desired behavior.”9 In the short run these programs hope to act as a social
safety net for the most marginalized segments of the population, while also developing
positive norms around beneficial behavior. Their long term goal is that positive social
norms will result in individual’s undertaking capital forming behavior without needing to
be provided capital incentives, freeing up government money for other activities.
Conditionality is often justified because of the broad social goals the programs serve,
the long run benefits to the individuals involved, and the fact they make social welfare
programs more palatable to taxpayers. Taxpayers are more likely to support programs
which use their money for productive enterprises where they could potentially see a long
term benefit. Imposing conditions reassures taxpayers that their money is spent well,
increasing their support for the program.
Insofar as these programs put conditions on the receipt of this money, they infringe
on the personal autonomy of the recipients. Individuals involved in these programs are
not able to exercise their full range economic choices, instead being constrained by a
paternalistic government that dictates the conditions an investment can be made. If we
8
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conclude that an individual is the best judge of what consumption choices will maximize
their welfare, imposing conditionality could result in sub-optimal welfare levels for
recipients. Recognizing that government policies reflect the desires of interested parties,
it is certainly possible that elites would construct conditionality to serve ulterior motives.
There is vigorous discussion about whether CCTs exist to fulfill a basic right, or if
they are responding to a need.10 This debate has been particularly rich in Brazil where it
was argued that basic human rights include economic rights. The constitutional assertion
which social assistance programs are based on does not include any discussion of
targeting, stating instead that the transfers are a basic right of citizenship. Despite this
assertion, political demands often push for increased restrictions on welfare transfers.11
Intrinsic in the idea of conditionality is the assumption that the government has the right
to restrict economic choices of its dependents, thereby curbing them of some of their
economic freedom. If it is the case that welfare transfers are a basic right than this
restriction is an illegitimate extension of government.
Recently there has been an increased emphasis on addressing southern
underdevelopment, and a renewed debate on how best this can be done. The Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in the late 1990’s, affirmed an international
commitment to addressing the most serious elements of extreme poverty in fifteen
targeted areas. Recognizing that extreme poverty often prevents people from having the
energy and time to develop the necessary skills to improve their welfare, the goals
specifically focused on issues--such as nutrition, potable water, and healthcare-- aimed at
10
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addressing the most egregious elements of extreme poverty. At the same time the goals
emphasize areas, such as equitable education, which are paramount for creating the
human capital necessary for economic advancement. Public private partnerships,
nongovernmental organization, international agencies, and national governments are all
working together to build policies and programs capable of addressing these complex and
interrelated issues.
While progress on the MDGs has been inconsistent if not slow, their very
existence seems to imply a partial international consensus on the presence of certain basic
rights, liberties, and entitlements. Agreements such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the preamble to the MDGs enumerate certain rights posed as
inalienable. We universally accept that slavery is a moral wrong, that torture is inhumane,
and that dying of starvation is inherently bad. This thesis will operate under the
assumption that certain entitlements, rights and liberties ought to be recognized and are
the kind that we ought to use in setting policies. This leaves plenty of discussion of what
obligations are, how far they extend to the underprivileged, and the interaction between
the rights of the privileged and the underprivileged. Given that many development
programs attempt to address these rights, understanding their nature has significant
implications for how we construct policies and implement conditionality. This thesis will
draw on the work of several prominent philosophical branches in order to examine the
values which can underpin redistribution and conditionality.
Conditionality itself has a rich and complicated history in the development
context. International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank impose conditions on developing countries for accepting assistance. While
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complex and contextually specific, these conditionality’s often were attached with the
goal of changing the country’s behavior in order to improve its competitiveness in the
global market. The effectiveness of these programs is certainly mixed. Often poorly
constructed mandates, improper implementation, or ulterior motives would disrupt the
policies effectiveness, sometimes causing more harm than good. In order to fully
understand if it is desirable to alter individual behavior by using conditions to create
incentives for socially beneficial outcomes, it is important that one closely examines how
poorly targeted mandates can de-rail a program’s effectiveness.
Conditional cash transfers have the potential to help alleviate current poverty
while also encouraging long run improvements in welfare through human capital
development. At the same time they raise a number of important theoretical and practical
questions which must be closely examined before constructing a policy. CCTs are like
parents offering to pay children for good grades: they essentially consist of a wealth
transfer from the privileged to the underprivileged provided they perform well. In one
respect one could understand social transfer programs as the rich fulfilling their
obligations to the underprivileged by transferring a just portion of their wealth. It could
also be argued that because the rich are giving up some of their endowment, they have
the right to expect a return from the recipients in the form of certain socially desirable
behaviors. In this case the rich are not necessarily fulfilling an unbridled obligation for
distributive justice, but instead providing a benefit for which they can make demands.
Conditions could be justified by the desire to produce positive socially beneficial
outcomes--such as increasing youth school attendance and decreasing crime--while
avoiding negative outcomes—such as eternal dependency on transfer income. The
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counter to this point is that people are the best judges of determining what would bring
them the most welfare, and it is paternalistic of the state to impose restrictions on
people’s freedom of action. However, it is possible that a short term restriction on
freedom of action may actually result in greater amount of choices in the long run. One of
the distinct advantages of many CCTs is they tend to expand access and opportunities
which participants have by increasing their wellbeing and marketable skills. It is quite
possible there is an intrinsic good to participating in socialized market interactions, and
participants in properly constructed social welfare programs will, in the long run, receive
the substantial benefits from engaging in these interactions.
Recently there has been increased focus on explanations of development which
move away from macro level indicators such as GDP, focusing instead on the complex
interrelated factors which determine individual welfare. One such approach championed
by Amartya Sen focuses on development as a function of an increase in an individual’s
wellbeing, measured by range and degree of potential actions an individual could
achieve.12 This approach allows one to argue that in situations where there is a tradeoff
between having more people above the poverty line and a lower GDP the former could
certainly be seen as the preferable option, especially in when the trade-off is significant.
A well-being metric is better able to capture the interconnected political, social,
educational, health, and infrastructural elements which play a role in improving people’s
welfare. One of the potential advantages of CCT programs is that they have the ability to
simultaneously improve a number of these interrelated elements.

12
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Just like IMF and World Bank’s conditionality’s in the 1980s, CCTs aim to
change the effective norms of the recipient’s behavior in order to affect long run desirable
outcomes. The long term goal of CCT programs is to have the behavior which is attached
to the cash incentive become something which is socially valued, liberating the state from
providing cash inducements. When social norms are properly targeted and appropriate
behavior effectively communicated this can be a desirable outcome. At the same time
prevailing social norms can undermine the program’s effectiveness. Successfully
implementing a CCT program will require careful analysis of norm transference in the
particular society in order to maximize positive behaviors while minimizing negative
impacts of prevailing norms.
Aside from the theoretical issues raised above, conditional cash transfer programs
raise a plethora of practical considerations for policymakers. They have to define an area
where a program could be helpful, and determine what goals need to achieved for it to be
successful. Once goals have been established, they need to design a program capable of
meeting these goals while minimizing negative impacts. They will need to ensure
sufficient funding and bureaucratic capacity to properly implement the program,
monitoring its progress to ensure it is achieving its objective.
This process takes place against several background considerations. There is a
worry that public transfers could crowd out private wealth transfers, though generally the
size of these wealth transfers is not sufficient to promote long run equality. 13 There is
often a worry that social safety nets will reduce work effort and result in dependency
from their recipients. CCT programs need to keep this consideration in mind and
13
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construct policies with provisions ensuring the recipients remain engaged in the labor
market. Although CCTs generally aim to address demand side issues, many endeavor to
strengthen the supply side as well.1415 While there is no one size fits all model for CCTs,
there are certainly lessons that policymakers can learn from to increase the likelihood of
their program’s success.
This thesis examines the philosophical issues and practical implications of CCT
programs. The normative position of this thesis is that there are certain values which we
want to enhance, and that these values are often interconnected in terms of their
associated outcomes. It will argue that conditionality can be a useful tool for securing
outcomes as well as affecting norms that encourage human dignity. The goal of social
policy should be to develop policies which can result in securing shared valued outcomes.
It will argue that the effectiveness of conditionality requires an understanding of the
relevant norms, entitlements, and their interconnectedness. To do this it will develop a
framework which policy analysts can use to evaluate the implications of a CCT program.
Only with that richer understanding can conditionality be used productively as part of a
country specific development strategy.

14

Rawlings and Rubio, Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs:
Lessons from Latin America
15

Rawlings and Rubio point out these features are particularly evident in Nicaragua and
Mexico. These programs set aside money to address additional demand on public
services, often using an amount proportional to increased demand to hire additional social
sector workers or contract with private services.
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Chapter I: The Nuts and Bolts of CCTs

Introduction: Program History and Design

Conditional cash transfer programs are social assistance programs that provide
cash transfers to poor households provided they make certain investments in human
capital, normally the recipient’s children. They generally target education, health, and
malnutrition in youth, often providing money to parents who send their children to school
or have them get regular doctors’ visits—typically both. Health and nutrition conditions
require regular checkups and “growth monitoring” for children, mandatory attendance at
prenatal care for mothers, and mother’s attendance at health related talks. Their education
provision usually requires regular school attendance, between 80 percent and 85 percent
of school days, while often requiring some demonstrated level of increased
performance.16
In many developing countries, social safety net programs are a crucial part of a
well-designed development strategy. They aim to manage social risk, increase equity,
reduce poverty, and provide social protection. Because of the potential long-term benefits
of positive behavior changes associated with conditionality, CCT programs could be a
vital part of a country’s development strategy. CCT programs seek to achieve the dual
goals of accomplishing a minimum consumption level for poor households, while also
aiming to encourage better investments in the future. By providing a minimum
consumption floor, CCT programs are able to provide social protection for families,

16
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enabling households to better manage risk. They can provide an important avenue for
governments to foster more inclusive growth, particularly after adopting macro policy
shifts which would have negative impacts on the underprivileged. 17
Since 1997 when nationwide CCT programs were adopted by Brazil and Mexico,
conditional cash transfer programs have increasingly become a staple of developing
countries social assistance program. As of 2009, nationwide programs targeting health
and education have been adopted in Brazil (Bolsa Familia), Mexico (Oportunidades),
Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo), Colombia (Familias en Accion) and Jamaica (Program of
the Advancement Through Health and Education). In addition to these national programs,
niche programs targeting a narrow geographic or demographic area have been adopted in
Chile and Turkey, while Honduras, Kenya and Nicaragua have recently implemented
small scale pilot programs. Brazil (Bolsa Escola) and Indonesia (Jaring Pengamanan
Sosial) have adopted national programs specifically targeting education, while
Bangladesh (Female Secondary School Assistance Program), Cambodia (Japan Fund for
Poverty Reduction and Education Sector Support Project), and Yeman (Basic Education
Development) have adopted regionally targeted programs.18
The size, scope, target population, and verification mechanism of the above
programs varies significantly from location to location. Implemented programs range in
size from 11 million families in Brazil to 215,000 families in Chile, though small pilot
programs exist which provide benefits to only a few thousand recipients. In large scale
programs coverage ranges from over 40 percent of the population in Ecuador and 20
17
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percent in Brazil and Mexico, to less than one percent in Cambodia. Conditional cash
transfer programs do not necessarily have to have a large impact on a country’s overall
budget. The largest CCT programs exist in Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, and these only
cost about 0.50 percent of the country’s GDP, while the program in Chile accounts for
only about 0.08 percent of GDP.19
Despite the wide variation in implementation, there are certain steps that
policymakers must go through in order to ensure the program is successful. Policymakers
must determine how much to spend on the CCT program and where this money is
coming from. Once budgetary decisions have been made officials need to target a
particular population and issue which needs to be addressed. Properly identified, a CCT
program can be designed and implemented to address the problem. The first step in this
process is targeting a population of recipients who can benefit from this program. Next,
they need to design benefit levels capable of achieving the program’s objectives and
develop mechanisms where these benefits can be transferred to the intended recipients.
Finally, programs need to incorporate mechanisms for moving recipients out of the
program, and evaluating how successful it has been at achieving its goals. This section
will briefly examine some of the key elements of CCTs, exploring the options available
to policymakers and the implications they have on the individual welfare of recipients.

Program Targeting:
Almost all CCT programs attempt to target their benefits to the poor with the hope
that it will achieve the greatest impact within a given budget or at least cost. In theory,
19
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when resources are effectively distributed to a marginalized target group, they maximize
the potential returns from the transfer. This result is particularly true with CCT
programs, as improvements in human capital associated with conditionality can cause
greater returns for wealth transfers. Effective targeting depends on minimizing leaks,
costs associated with program implementation, while maximizing efficiency of the
targeting by minimizing inclusion and exclusion errors.
The effectiveness of targeting depends heavily on the information available to
program administrators. In many countries implementing CCT programs has been a
major catalyst for gathering demographic information, developing poverty maps, and
creating household targeting systems.20 Because targeting is such a crucial element for
the effectiveness of the CCT program, it is important that countries use the most effective
strategy and construct the best infrastructure for their given situation. There are three
strategies which have been used for identifying eligible households for transfers: means
tests, proxy means test, and community assessments. Often, these methods are combined
with geographic, gender based, or self targeting systems to further refine the category of
recipient. Each of these different methods has distinct advantages and disadvantages
which must be weighed depending on the CCTs context and goal.
Means Tests:
Of the above methods, means tests are generally considered the “gold standard”
of targeting. They seek to collect as much information as possible on the household’s
income or wealth, verifying it with exterior sources like tax authorities or welfare
agencies. When these verifications are not available, records of bills, pay stubs or taxes
20
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can be used as a substitute. In many cases social workers also go to a house to
qualitatively determine a households living condition and make a judgment on eligibility.
This potentially exposes applicants to the personal bias of the social worker, encouraging
corruption on the part of social worker and deception from the recipient. This system is
best implemented in areas where there is sufficient documentation of verifiable income,
where administrative capacity is high, and where large enough potential benefits justify
the administrative costs. This method, along with geographic targeting, has been used to
great success in Brazil as part of the Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Familia, Bolsa Alimentacao,
and PETI programs.21
Proxy Means Tests:
Employed in 29 out of 42 active CCT programs, proxy means tests are by far the
most popular method of household targeting.22 While the particulars vary depending on
the programs, the structure of proxy means test is generally consistent. First used
extensively in Chile, proxy means tests use statistical methods to generate a score for
applicant households generally using data from household surveys. Categories can
include, but are not limited to: “location and quality of the households dwelling, its
ownership of durable goods, its demographic structure, and the education and possible
occupations of its adult members.”23 Systemic variation comes from differences in the
quality of information and the methods and rigor of statistical analysis. Oftentimes,
certain elements of the survey are verified by social workers making visits to applicant’s
21
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homes. In situations where such external verification is not possible, creative solutions
have been employed to ensure accuracy. Once a household’s score is calculated it is
compared against a predetermined cutoff in order to determine program eligibility. Many
countries, such as Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, and Pakistan, establish proxy means tests
when first implementing their CCT programs, subsequently updating them as experience
and better institutions improve their capacity.24
The advantage of proxy means testing is that it requires less information than
traditional means testing, and is able to incorporate numerous different objective
elements into the analysis. At the same time it has its drawbacks. Its administrative costs
are high, requiring a relatively large technologically knowledgeable staff capable of
managing large amounts of data. By using a statistical formula to determine eligibility
this strategy risks significant errors of exclusion or inclusion by emphasizing certain
variables for determining a household’s welfare. In practice, proxy means testing is
usually led by a central agency, but much of everyday work is staffed to local
municipalities. This could have beneficial or negative implications depending on the
communication between and capacities of federal and municipal agencies. It is best
applied in countries that high administrative capacities for programs aimed at addressing
chronic poverty in economically stable situations. In theory, proxy means testing has the
advantage of being an objective standard against which all potential beneficiaries are able
to be objectively judged. 25

24
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Community Targeting:
Community-based targeting is the third prominent method of household
identification. It is used along with geographic targeting in Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Ecuador, Kenya and Nigeria.26 This method uses a group of community
leaders, such as community elders, school officials, or parent teacher associations, to
determine eligibility for a program. This method relies entirely on local information and
individual circumstances, possibly providing more accurate and less costly information.
At the same time it can run into problems of local biases--certain less favored community
members may be deemed ineligible for benefits--risking community disunity. As opposed
to the previous methods of identifying targets using objective national standards of need,
community targeting enables local leaders to take community circumstances into account
when judging welfare eligibility. Applicants are considered in terms of their social value
and social need in addition to their individual wellbeing. An argument which is often
advanced by community leaders against centrally targeted distribution is that targeting
goes against community solidarity and the spirit of self help.27 At the same time,
providing too much discretion without adequate conditions or oversight could lead to
abuses. Because of these considerations, community targeting is particularly useful in
situations where there is low administrative capacity, high community cohesion, and the
target population is relatively small. 28
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Categorical Targeting and Errors:

In addition to the above household identification mechanisms, governments often
employ categorical mechanisms for refining the target population. Geographic targeting,
the most popular of these methods, restricts potential candidates to a particular
geographic area. This is useful for both improving a regions general welfare and
aggregated human capital stock. Its simplicity is one of the reasons that geographic
targeting is so popular: it is used in almost two-thirds of all CCT programs. Similarly,
demographic targeting restricts potential beneficiaries who have certain age or gender
based qualifications. These restrictions may aim to right certain historical imbalances or
achieve scale gains by targeting a particularly productive segment of the population.
Empirically, gender targeting is the most common form of demographic targeting, with
programs in India, Bangladesh, Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Cambodia using it as a
criterion.29 All of these targeting mechanisms provide valuable information to the
country’s government. Many constitute a significant part of the country’s “institutional
infrastructure,” and are useful for other social programs and government decisions. 30
While the above methods of targeting aim to limit the population of recipients,
often targeting errors, and errors of exclusion and inclusion, constrain the potential
benefits. Errors of inclusion risk providing benefits to recipients who do not qualify for
the program, potentially resulting in a regressive policy and a less efficient allocation of
resources. Similarly, many programs suffer from an error of exclusion, not allowing
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individuals to participate in the program that are eligible for it. Often this happens when
the program is not fully funded and has to cap the number of recipients below the target
level. It also often results from insufficient information on household surveys, meaning
eligible households slip through the cracks. Sometimes social pressure can encourage
eligible households not to engage in a program because of stigmas attached to
participating. While leakages can cause inefficiency, they can potentially make the
program more popular with groups whose support is needed for budget allocations. As a
result it might be more beneficial for policymakers to include some members of the
middle class who do not explicitly need transfers.
Costs:
In addition to the errors of inclusion and exclusion, implementing targeting
mechanisms have associated costs which must be taken into account when analyzing the
viability of a particular program. Administrative costs are the costs of gathering
information to make a decision on potential applicants. The scope of these costs is hard to
determine, particularly because staff and administrative resources are generally shared
amongst different departments. Also, while administrative costs may decrease the bottom
line for the programs, having better programmatic oversight may result in greater
targeting efficiency. Targeting costs average about 4 percent of total program costs,31 and
range from 25-75 percent of total administrative costs. Costs per interview range between
US $3 and US $8 per beneficiary. Administrative costs aggregate and tend to be higher
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in the start-up phase of the program. They can be minimized by using the same means
test infrastructure across different programs.32
In addition to administrative costs, private costs are an additional factor which
must be considered before a program is implemented. If they are large enough they could
discourage an applicant from applying to the program. These costs include having
insufficient information about the system, having to pay for bus fares, fees, or bribes in
order to apply, and difficulty in obtaining the proper documentation. Additionally, many
programs with a workfare provision require recipients to engage in public works in order
to receive a benefit. This can cause recipients to use their time working for the state
instead of seeking other productive employment.33
Social costs can arise when there is negative stigma associated with participating
in a particular program. Such a stigma might discourage individuals from applying,
hurting the ability of the CCT program to have economies of scale benefits.
Unfortunately, stigmatization often goes hand in hand with transparency, as many
governments publish lists of recipients in order to encourage transparency and fairness.
To combat stigmatization, governments often develop information campaigns about the
program’s benefits and justifications, while also encouraging the development of positive
social norms towards conditional cash transfer programs. One of the advantages of CCT
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programs is that conditions help combat the public perception that recipients are living
off the public dole.34
Unfortunately programs are not formulated in a vacuum; instead politicians with
different interests develop the budget and the criterion for receiving benefits. Sources of
political support can have an impact on determining eligibility criteria, while public
perception of CCT programs can shape how far politicians are willing to go in providing
benefits. 35The relative effect of public perception on politicians also depends on how
responsive the political system is to voter’s desires. These effects could be positive or
negative; in situations where countries value social justice politicians might receive
positive support from voters for CCT programs, while a fiscally conservative electorate
could put pressure against CCT programs. One of the advantages of CCT programs is
that conditionality provides a justification for politicians by allowing them to say the
country is receiving a public good from the program.
Program Design and Implementation:
Once policymakers have determined the best method of targeting a population for
a program, they must a implement strategy to move participants through the program.
The first step in this process is to use their chosen targeting mechanism to move from the
general population to the targeted one. This is dictated by the eligibility criteria of the
policy choice. They need to ensure that there is administrative capacity to implement the
program, that it is transparent and politically feasible, and that its policies coordinate with
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previous social programs. This ensures both a public perception of fairness and program
efficiency.36 Once a population has been targeted, self-targeting by eligible people
determines the take up rate of the program. In order to minimize errors of exclusion it is
important that policymakers ensure that potential applicants have accurate information
about the program and are aware of their eligibility. It is also important that there is an
open application process which minimizes transaction costs to beneficiaries.
The eligibility rate determines how many of the applicants are eligible to be
beneficiaries of the program. This is determined by eligibility established for the
program. Depending on the nature of the program the self-targeted applicants may need
to have their eligibility verified. In many cases applicants have to provide paper
documentation of their eligibility, while in others intake workers may make home visits.
Using third parties as an independent verification source has become increasing popular.
This can come in the form of community panels determining eligibility, or external
agencies collecting and analyzing data on potential recipients.
The long run goal of conditional cash transfer programs is to improve the wellbeing of recipients by supplementing their income and accumulating human capital.
Inherently these programs are designed to be transitory, with beneficiaries eventually
exiting the program. It is important that policymakers construct appropriate exit criteria,
while also providing easy access for beneficiaries to re-certify if they want to remain in
the program.
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Developing Benefit Levels and Conditionalities:
Once a particular population has been targeted and a means of determining
eligibility been developed, policymakers need to determine the particular benefit
structure and distributional mechanism of the CCT program. The benefit levels for the
programs depend on the programs objectives, the model policy makers have
implemented, and budgetary, administrative and political constraints the program faces.
Benefit levels can have flat or variable formulas, with variation depending on contextual
factors such as age or gender of the family’s members, as well as the family’s geographic
location or the time of the year.
Benefit levels for CCT program reflect the dual objectives of supplementing
income and encouraging human capital accumulation. Conditional cash programs have
the additional complication of needing oversight of compliance with the program
conditions. Often these programs need to be designed in such a way as to encourage
proper self selection. For example, in workfare programs the benefit level is the wage
rate, which is set slightly below the average wage rate for unskilled workers in order to
ensure proper self-selection.37 Only individuals who are unemployed will see workfare as
a valuable use of their time. Setting appropriate benefit levels is a constant process as
overall budget constraints change and the welfare situation of the poor is in flux. While it
is important to make benefits contextually responsive, it is equally important to safeguard
recipients from arbitrary changes to their benefits.
Benefit structures for CCT programs are generally quite straightforward, normally
differentiating payments by the number of children in the eligible age range. Only two
37
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programs differentiate recipients by poverty level, while a few do so by the age or gender
of the students. Recognizing the cost associated with costs of obtaining health and
education services, most condition cash programs give benefits directly proportional to
the number of students in the recipient household, though some programs cap this
number. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia programs caps this at $45, while Mexico caps it at
$153.38 In some programs, such as those in Peru, El Salvador and Panama, flat benefits
are paid to recipients. Flat benefits are sometimes used in situations where the budget
cannot cover all the poor, or if it is felt that incentives should be used to learn a new
behavior, but are not necessary for each subsequent child. 39
Each of these benefit structure are designed in light of the contextual
considerations of the country and environment in which they are created. It is important
that benefit levels and conditions are designed with full knowledge of desired outcomes
and opportunity costs of a program. This requires a careful understanding of what
outcomes a program might have and how one might value them. The following Chapter
will explore the value principles which underscore redistributive and conditional
programs, with the goal of developing a functional framework that could be used for
policymakers seeking to implement CCT programs in their country.
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Chapter II: Valuing Redistribution

Introduction: Valuing as a Framework

The first Chapter explored the different types of CCT programs and the various
ways of implementing them, but what constitutes a legitimate claim for a conditional
program has not been examined. To what degree can individuals make legitimate
demands on the state, and to what extent may the state put conditions on these demands,
limiting recipient’s economic autonomy? How far do these claims extend? Do the poor
legitimately demand redistribution only from their own government, or is there a global
obligation to support distributive justice? What role does the market play in
differentiating between these outcomes, and what is the relationship between the state
and the market? Understanding these issues is necessary for effectively implementing and
evaluating CCT programs. They are crucial for evaluating the relationship between a
citizen and the state, and between participants in a market economy. This section is
going to examine the different arguments for redistribution, government intervention in
market relations, and their implications on CCT design and implementation.
Philosophical debates about economic redistribution and social justice generally
focus on the extent of property rights and the limits of the legitimate demands that
individuals can make on their fellow citizens. This thesis is interpreting right in the
traditional sense, as fundamental normative rules about what is either allowed to people
without interference (negative rights), or rules which dictate what is owed to people
(positive rights). Philosophical discussions of redistribution compare the relative weight
of protections demanded by negative rights with the obligations resulting from positive
31

rights. This has broadly been split into two groups, with different schools of thought
emphasizing different criteria for determining just distributions. The first are the
thinkers who argue that considerations of justice are independent of the outcome. These
can be differentiated to those in the Lockean and egalitarian traditions, though there are a
number of different variations of arguments within each school. This paper will focus on
the neo-Kantian work of Arthur Ripstein, the egalitarian arguments articulated by John
Rawls, and the strict libertarian position argued by Robert Nozick. Secondly, many
thinkers argue the outcome of a situation is what should be considered for evaluating
justice. This thesis will focus on the classic utilitarian position advanced by Bentham and
Sidgewick. It will also look at attempts to bridge the gaps between these two positions,
specifically focusing on the substantive freedoms approach advanced by Amartya Sen.
This chapter will look at the arguments for and against different variants of
economic redistribution advanced by the above philosophers. To do this it will first
briefly explain their position on rights, redistribution, and social justice. It will then test
these arguments with the issues raised by CCT programs. Should there be wealth
transfers at all? If so, does the fact they are conditional have implications on the nature of
the transfer? Is conditionality a consideration imposed for the sake of the taxpayers
whose wealth is redistributed, or is it employed for the long run benefit of transfer
recipients? Do the different elements of conditional cash programs illustrated in Chapter
One alter the implications of the wealth transfer, and does the source of the funds,
domestic or international, change the nature of these concerns? By analyzing the different
aspects of conditionality we will hopefully be able to gain a better understanding of the
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benefits and implications of CCT programs, and develop a more robust justification for
their implementation.

The Lockean Foundation of Political Rights:
Because conditional cash transfer programs redistribute wealth subject to certain
conditions, they raise fundamental questions about the extent and limitation of property
rights. The argument John Locke advanced in his Second Treatise of Government is
fundamental to understanding the foundations of the debate on justice and redistribution.
The Lockean argument uses the state’s position as a guarantor of rights to justify state
action in order to enable its citizen to engage in fair market interactions. John Locke
argues that the state emerges out of a social contract with the explicit purpose of
guaranteeing property rights. By restricting the liberties of the majority to steal an
individual’s property the state ensures his right to use his property as he sees fit. This is a
private right, as the rights to one’s property remain exclusively his own. This restriction
is a necessary precondition for safe market interaction; absent it one could not be assured
that he would not be attacked and have his property stolen.
Property has a distinct civil condition. It is exclusive in the sense that a citizen is
entitled to exclude others from using it and is justified in seeking the states help to protect
this property.40 Public lawgiving, which makes conferring private property rights binding
on others, requires a united will to enforce. Because the state is, more or less, assumed to
generally reflect the democratic will of the citizens, restrictions on individual autonomy
with the goal of effectively securing fair private interactions are legitimate.
40
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Locke’s interpretation of property rights comes with an important caveat. A man,
by mixing his labor with an object, has the right to exclude it from the common property
provided that “there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”41 This statement
implies there are initial preconditions of distribution which must be met before property
rights can legitimately be enforced and exchange can take place. Redistribution is
legitimate in the instance where a transfer results in a distribution which violates the
proviso. Similarly, Locke would be in favor of attaching conditionalities to these
redistributions, provided they are designed in such a way that they will increase the
recipient’s ability to acquire a minimum amount of property.
Locke’s proviso has become the subject of much interpretation and debate, as
individuals in the Lockean tradition use the state’s role as a guarantor of private rights
and its mandate to secure legitimate preconditions for private exchange to justify
different levels of state intervention. Depending on one’s interpretation of the proviso, the
scope and level of the intervention can vary greatly. The guarantee of property rights is
essential for the functioning of any state, and underscores the conditions under which
legitimate transfers can take place.
Strict Libertarianism: Robert Nozick
The libertarian interpretation of Locke’s proviso argues for a very narrow scope
of legitimate state action. Robert Nozick offers one of the more demanding versions of
libertarianism. His strict reading of Locke argued that the state is only “an organization
created by private persons for distinctive private purposes,” and thus it should only
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intervene to guarantee conditions for market interactions.42 Individuals maintain an
absolute right of self ownership. Rights consist of side constraints, prohibitions against
the violation of other people’s right of self ownership, and are lexically prior to other
considerations.
Nozick argues that using state power to redistribute wealth violates the
prohibition against aggression, by making one person better off at the expense of another.
His view prohibits violations of side constraints in pursuit of broader goals, and sees
redistributive taxation being akin to slavery. The state should only intervene in situations
where a constraint on the general population’s liberty is justified in order to protect
individual rights, or in extreme situation of “catastrophic moral horrors.”43 The above
conditions result in a minimalist state, with the state guaranteeing the baseline conditions
which allow legitimate transactions to take place, policing transactions in order to ensure
this requirement is met, but maximizing its citizen’s liberties. Redistribution is only
justified in order to finance the policing activities of the minimal state in order for it to
finance general protective services. Citizens may band together privately to address
issues such as inequality or education. In these situations, conditionality would be
legitimate, as the wealth could buy the poor’s commitment to improve their children’s
human capital for the improvement of their long-term prosperity, but these are private
transactions and are not considerations of the state.44
Nozick’s view makes entitlement principles the beginning and end of distributive
justice, provided that the configuration of holding comes from a legitimate transfer of
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legitimately acquired holdings.--justice should be assessed by the justice of the procedure
which facilitated it.45 The view is historical and argues against patterned distributions.46
He argues that if ones procedural rights restrict the legitimate right of others there is a
principle of rectification. In such situations the violator will be obligated to provide
rectification equal to the amount which was lost.
Built into the high priority Nozick places on property rights is an
acknowledgement that there are certain preconditions which must be met for holdings to
be just. He upholds the proviso stating “any adequate theory of justice in action will
contain a proviso similar to the weaker ones we have attributed to Locke.” Nozick argues
that if a legitimate transfer will make a third party worse than they would have been in
the state of nature, then the transfer becomes illegitimate. The legitimate exercise of
rights is conditional on the proviso being secured, though Nozick believes this
conditionality is minimal and unlikely in market capitalism.
While Nozick’s position in regard to conditionality would appear to be relatively
simple, his embrace of a limited proviso clouds the picture. In one respect Nozick is
happy to say that there are linkages among improving health and education and broad
economic growth, but that it is not the business of the state to engage in trying to secure
those conditionalities because the only way to do it is to violate an individual’s property
rights. He will not necessarily deny that empirically conditionality’s are beneficial, or
even that they are morally attractive--people are better off if they have expanded
capabilities—but it is no business of the state to do these things. Because property rights
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are fundamental, there is no political right for redistribution. The state does not possess
any special rights; it is bound by the requisites of negative rights of fellow citizens.47
While Nozick’s argument focuses on the priority of negative rights, by accepting
Locke’s proviso as a pre-condition for legitimizing transfers he allows that some
considerations of distribution are necessary for transfers. If the baseline appropriation
which is mandated by the proviso is breached then he loses his property rights. Because
the proviso sets conditions on the legitimate exercise of property rights it is possible that
this could generate a certain kind of effective conditionality in broader politics.
Developing a program which ensures that no legitimate transaction would
undermine the conditions of the proviso could actually increase economic efficiency
while legitimizing all transactions. It is possible that redistribution could be justified if it
satisfies the pre-conditions of the minimal state. If the state has to provide general
protective services against the poor from disrupting legitimate transactions, and the
wealth necessary to provide those services is greater than conditioned redistributions
which would prevent them, then redistribution could be justified as it would minimize
wealth transfers.
One way to parse out Nozick’s position on conditionality is to examine his
discussion of Rawls’ principle of distributive justice. Rawls argues against historical
distribution of natural talents and abilities because they are morally arbitrary and thus
would not be accepted by individuals in the original position. Nozick argues that the
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original position is designed for negative reflective evaluation about differences in
natural holdings.48 His counter argument takes the following form:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

People are entitled to their natural assets
If people entitled to X, they are entitled to any Y that flow from X
Peoples holding flow from their natural assets
People entitled to their holdings
If people entitled to something they ought to have it 49

His first premise argues that if people have an asset, and the asset does not violate
another’s Lockean right to that asset, they are entitled to that asset. In responding to
Rawls’ argument Nozick makes the point that there is no discussion of how individuals
have chosen to develop their natural talents, pointing out that Rawls implicit assumption
is that initial endowments and external factors dictate everything noteworthy about an
individual’s character. Nozick rejects this notion, arguing instead for a theory which
venerates an individual’s autonomy and which does not rely on external factors dictating
individual decision making. 50
Nozick brings several lessons to the broad discussion of conditionality. He
articulates a strict libertarian framework through which redistribution is viewed with the
strictest scrutiny. Despite the extreme position his argument takes, his adherence to the
proviso demonstrates that there are almost always necessary conditions of distribution
which need to be met before market forces can operate. Policymakers have to ensure that
material conditions do not preclude individual autonomy.
He also raises the question of whether historically illegitimate transactions can
undermine the legitimacy of current holdings. He argues that, because of the principle of
48
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rectitude, when holdings have been determined by illegitimate transactions, individuals
are entitled to receive transfers equal to their lost wealth. Thus, programs which seek to
address historically marginalized groups may legitimize transfers of wealth. This
argument is broadly made by Pogge, who argues the history of international economy has
been one of exploitation by colonizers. Inequality in developing countries is the result of
this history of exploitation, requiring redress from developed countries to developing
ones.51 Even if we look simply at a domestic context, historic inequality resulting from
extreme marginalization, like the Native Americans in the United States, could require
wealth transfers. It is important to note that the principle of rectitude would not allow
conditions on these transfers, as they are fulfilling an obligation which arose from
illegitimate takings.
Political Foundation: Ripstein
In Force and Freedom Arthur Ripstein presents a neo-Kantian argument for
redistribution based on just preconditions. Kant argues that taxation and redistribution
are justified in terms of securing the private rights of its citizens, what Kant terms the
rightful condition. Though Kant grants the state’s requirement to work for its citizens
might restrict the scope of its mandate, it can also generate a “duty to support the poor.”52
This duty comes from the state’s need for “united legislative will.”53 In a reasonably
democratic society, the state speaks and acts for all, and thus all must be represented. In
order for it to derive this power justly its citizens must have the right relation to one
another and this relation cannot undermine their united will.
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It is impossible for impoverished people to meet the rightful conditions for just
interaction. In Kant’s view, poverty is analogous to slavery in the sense that the slave is
dependent upon his master and therefore unable to share a united will with him.
Similarly, extreme poverty is a situation where one citizen is dependent on the
benevolence of another, or they are excluded from the system entirely. The view argues
that an optional act of beneficence leaves the recipient dependent and does not recognize
their entitlement to function independently as a free agent. Instead, it treats it as an option
of other agents whether to provide them the resources that makes them more independent
or not. Being in extreme poverty and excluded from the normal system of exchange is the
extreme form of dependence, because agents are faced with the choice of taking whatever
terms are given to them or face extinction.
For Kant, either situation is unacceptable. The goal of the state is to secure
individual freedom which allows him to pursue his own purpose as he sees fit. Relations
of dependence prevent this from happening. Because extreme poverty precludes a united
will, it is justified for the state to take action to secure the necessary pre-conditions for a
united will. Taxation is justified because private dependence is institutional, “it is the
consequence of the creation of enforceable property rights,” while the well-off have can
be taxed because they “owe their existence”54 to the state and the property rights it
guarantees. Ripstein argues that what is often classified as charity properly understood is
a fundamental entitlement of those who are recipients. If redistributions do not take place
the conditions of individual freedom cannot be met. The level of redistribution should be
enough to allow the individual to fulfill his most necessary natural needs: a level of social
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provision which enables them to have the opportunity to engage equally in a united will.
This claim follows from the right to not be dependent on others; citizens are entitled to a
certain basic level of material resources which they can justly demand from their fellow
citizens.
Kant’s approach to redistribution reflects his general argument that a person is
responsible for his own life.55 He argues that a person is entitled to determine what
purposes they should have, but this is subject to “the requirement that others have the
same entitlements.” To fulfill this obligation it is necessary to provide the background
conditions which enable them to exercise this right: it is necessary to secure the
individual’s private right to exercise their own choices without public restraints which
would violate their private freedom. In order to facilitate this, he argues for a doctrine of
formal equality of opportunity, though the discussion of this is primarily focused on state
offices and hereditary rules.56 Despite this, Kant’s argument that republicanism is the
foundation of a state’s legitimacy is crucial for Ripstein’s interpretation of the welfare
state. For the state to have legitimacy it needs to come from a united legislative will. To
achieve this, the citizens must have material preconditions which enable him to engage
on reasonably equitable terms. Further, the state needs to maintain its own material
conditions, allowing it to provide protection both internally for its citizens, and against
external threats.57 To do this, it needs a viable economy and robust population. Education
and healthcare are inputs which can provide long term stability, enabling the state to
maintain its legitimacy while fulfilling its vital functions.
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Education is a necessary pre-condition for the rightful conditions. It enables
citizens to be part of the united will, while also providing them the means to stand up for
their rights against both private persons and the state.58 Education also provides some
protection against poverty and the dependency it creates. Publicly funded education is
justified because of the crucial role it plays in securing these necessary individual rights.
The state has an interest in seeing its citizens educated for the public good, and
consequently can legitimately compel children to go to school with its citizens paying for
the privilege.
The above analysis has important implications for the outcomes associated with
conditional cash transfer systems. Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant would support
programs which redistributed wealth with the explicit goal of achieving the material
preconditions necessary for a just state. Education and healthcare are two programs
which are of primary importance because having a healthy and educated populace
enables the state to maintain its material conditions over time, while also enabling
citizens to engage equitably with their fellows. Education is also crucial for fulfilling the
rightful conditions associated with the original contract, as an educated population can
more legitimately enact laws over themselves.59 Ripstein’s argument supports targeted
redistribution aimed at improving the health and education of a state’s citizens. His
argument also lends support for associating conditionality with these wealth transfers. If
the goal of the state is to secure the individual freedom of its citizens it can legitimately
impose conditionality on wealth transfers as long as their long term outcomes will
increase human capital levels and help to establish the rightful condition. The argument
58
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recognizes the state’s interest in having healthy and educated citizens, as these are preconditions for its own legitimacy.
Not only was Kant concerned with governments legitimately representing the will
of its citizens, he was also focused on citizens being able to participate in governance.
The role that community members can play in both designing and administering CCTs
can significantly increase its impact locally while also encouraging civic engagement by
bureaucrats, technocrats, and recipients. Local administration enables the community to
serve both as a local support mechanism and governance structure, while simultaneously
increasing the program’s efficiency and legitimacy.
Kant’s argument highlights some of the additional benefits of CCT programs.
From a government’s perspective programs targeting health care and education are
necessary for achieving its own legitimacy; conditionality is justified by the need to
ensure that rightful conditions are met for its citizens. Taxes supporting the redistributive
program are justly levied on the well-off members of society because they owe their
wealth to the existence of the exclusive property rights accorded to them by the states.
The position demonstrates the importance of explicitly defining what benefit levels are
necessary for achieving a level of basic necessary needs. It also shows the additional
benefits associated with civic participation.
The Egalitarian Tradition: Rawls and Distributive Justice
In Theory of Justice Rawls argues that rules governing transfers are not sufficient
for maintaining a just distribution. Over time transactions will result in the accumulation
of wealth and political power which undermine the background conditions required for
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free and fair agreements.60 His argument for a social process view of justice focuses on
“the basic structure and regulation required to maintain background justice over time for
all persons equally.”61 Once the background structure is established pure procedural
justice can function, providing “everyone following publicly recognized rules of
cooperation, and honoring the claims these rules specify.”62 Rawls believes that
individuals are free, within the background conditions of justice, to advance their own
ends how they see fit.63 The following is an account of how the principles of justice
establish the background conditions for pure procedural justice, and how conditionality
can be used to achieve the background conditions.
The first principle protects an individual’s rights and liberties, establishes the
institutional preconditions for justice, and is considered lexically prior to the second
principle: the second principle is applied within the background institutions which satisfy
the first principle.64 The first principle states that “each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for others.”65 Liberty is understood in reference to the agents who are free, the
restrictions from which they are free, and what they are free or not free to do.66 The idea
of the first principle is that it secures the formal equality of basic liberties: including
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liberty of thought and conscience, political liberties, rights and liberties covered by the
rule of law, and liberty of integrity.67
The liberties defined in the first principle establish the constitutional foundations
of government. Rawls argues the priority of basic rights and liberties presumes the
background economic and social conditions are such that would allow the basic
institutions to be reasonably democratic. These barriers must not come from a lack of
economic means, education, or skills. Additionally, when redistribution is done, it is in
accordance with the difference principle, which incorporates the idea of reciprocity and
mutual advantage.68 It will be argued that the outcomes associated with conditionality
establish the preconditions for the exercise of basic rights, as well as facilitating the
formal equality of opportunity established by the second principle if justice. The rules of
the background institutions are designed in order to achieve fair social cooperation over
time, and are necessary to preserve background justice.69
The second principle of justice establishes the conditions under which social and
economic inequalities are legitimate.70 The first part of the second principle guarantees
equality of opportunity, while the second part of the second principle addresses income
distribution. This principle applies at the legislative stage, effecting the institutions of
distributive justice in particular contextual social and economic situations. He argues
that economic inequalities are to be arranged so that “they are to be of the greatest benefit
to the least-advantaged members of society,” in accordance with the difference principle,
and that “offices and conditions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair
67

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 45
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 52
69
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 52
70
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 48

68

45

equality of opportunity.” Fair equality of opportunity means that, given a distribution of
native endowments, talents, and abilities, all individuals have a fair chance to achieve
public offices and social positions regardless of social class or origin. To secure this
opportunity may require transfers of wealth for things such as housing or healthcare, as
well as providing natural endowments and socially productive skills. These
redistributions are necessary preconditions for establishing justice as fairness.
Redistribution should be done in accordance with the difference principle. This
encourages mutually productive social interaction. Rawls stipulates that an individual in
the original position would choose to arrange inequalities in this way. Because of the
difference principle, we should act in accordance with the benefit of the least best off
person; society should be arranged such that unjust distribution of wealth is redistributed.
Therefore, the second part of the second principle guarantees that the first will have
fundamental worth by ensuring a secure supply of wealth and income as well as a fair
chance to participate.
The guarantee provided by the second principle is crucial for understanding
Rawls’ position on redistribution and conditionality. Rawls recognizes the inherent
advantage of liberty advanced by equal citizenship is subject to “their capacity to advance
their ends within the framework the system defines.”71 Equal opportunity essentially acts
as a conditionality upon exercising a liberty over property. Unjust economic inequality
needs to be overcome and fair equality of opportunity need to be achieved.
We can now turn to an analysis of the Rawlsian position on conditional cash
transfers. Given the structure of the first and second principles, it is clear that Rawls is
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supportive of redistributive programs. They are necessary to address inequalities of
liberty, opportunity, income, and wealth which are not beneficial to all.72 He is
particularly explicit in his support of transfers which support education: “the difference
principle would allocate resources in education, say, so as to improve the long term
expectations of the least favored.”73 Conditionality can be used as a tool to achieve the
economic and social preconditions for establishing just institutions as well as providing
the means for achieving fair equality of opportunity. The government’s role in
redistribution is unmistakable, as the principle of common interest dictates the relative
ranking of institutions based on how well they pursue the conditions necessary for
equality. 74
In an effectively administered program there will be many potential recipients
who do not meet the material preconditions to qualify for the transfer. The individual in
Rawls’ original position would choose a redistributive program that would ensure they
receive a fair share of the pie. At the same time it could be argued that if the criterion of
restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties is such that they maximize rights and
liberties for others, a short term restriction on the freedom of action could be justified
because it establishes the preconditions for the exercise of procedural justice. The
outcomes which conditionality is tied to, particularly education and health, are necessary
for establishing the institutional foundations required for the first principle as well
allowing basic equality of opportunity.

72

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, A Restatement, 62
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, A Restatement, 101
74
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, A Restatement, 97

73

47

While Rawls will support general conditionality, it is likely that different forms of
conditionality will receive more support than others. His focus on reducing absolute
inequality would lend itself toward a means test or proxy means test method of
determining eligibility as these enable objective interpersonal comparisons of different
members of society, though he would certainly appreciate the contextual input provided
by community engagement. Government would legitimately be involved in this process,
and taxes are properly levied with the explicit goal of redistribution. Given the strength of
his two principles it is unlikely that Rawls would take the interests of the taxpayers into
account when determining whether wealth transfers were legitimate. Conditionalities
establish the background conditions for developing institutions in accordance with the
first principle of justice, as well as providing the means for achieving fair equality of
opportunity.
Rawls’ position raises the question of whether conditionalities are justified or
not, and whose interest administrators should be seeking to maximize when administering
a program. If economic rights are inviolable, as was argued by some factions in Brazil,
than imposing conditionality’s and restricting the potential behavior of recipients would
actually undermine the very rights the redistribution is seeking to grant. There is a worry
that people in the original position would not choose a method of redistribution where
they could potentially be left out. In order to address these concerns, policymakers have
to carefully think through both the goals of CCT programs and the implications of
imposing conditionality so as to ensure background conditions are met.

48

Utilitarian Liberalism:
In contrast with the thinkers who argue justice should be considered ex ante
outcomes, proponents of outcome based approaches evaluate justice based on the
situation post redistribution. Utilitarian consequentialist thinkers like Benthem and
Sidgewick argue the most just outcomes are those which result in the greatest aggregate
utility. Some modern interpreters use modified versions of utilitarianism to develop
benchmarked outcomes as a barometer for policy success, while policymakers often
appeal to utilitarian arguments when justifying a particular policy.
Classic utilitarianism was developed by Jeremy Benthem in the early 19th century.
Benthem famously argued for a common sense morality where the outcome which would
result in the greatest aggregate happiness should dictate: “By the principle of utility I
mean that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according
to the tendency which it appears to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question.”75 For Benthem, happiness is determined by the balance of
pleasure and pain, and polices should be chosen based on their expected outcome. 76 In a
social sense utilitarian calculations determine the consequences of an action, look at the
welfare outcome of the action, and sum these in order to get an aggregate ranking.
Society is just when its major institutions are arranged to achieve the greatest net
satisfaction.77
The problems associated with a utilitarian approach are well documented. A
purely utilitarian calculation is willing to sacrifice the good for the sake of the many,
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justifying actions, such as the public execution of an innocent man in order to scare the
rest of the population into not committing crimes. Utilitarianism ignores important nonutility considerations like freedoms, rights, which are only valued in terms of the relative
utility they produce.78 In general, utilitarianism does not taken into account distributional
differences within a society, except in how they affect aggregate utility, though recent
attempts at modernizing utility have focused on the different marginal utility transfer
recipient receives compared to the decrease in utility from the taxpayer.79 Though
promising, it is difficult to determine what the marginal utility for each individual is, and
it does not take into account the non-utility considerations. Despite these drawbacks, the
utilitarian approach does make some significant contributions to the discussion of the
metrics of development. It demonstrates the importance of taking account of the results of
a social program, and the need to look at people’s well-being in different social
arrangements.80
A utilitarian interpretation of conditionality is fairly simple while also being
profoundly important. Because consequentialist justifications are often made by
policymakers, answering a utilitarian calculation is an important gauge for how effective
a position is. The pure utilitarian redistribution would be justified if it created a greater
level of aggregate happiness. Redistributive programs are extremely likely to result in an
increase in aggregate utility because it is highly likely the poor will have higher marginal
utility from receiving the wealth transfer than the rich will have from losing it. Whether
attaching conditionality’s to programs is justified or not depends on weighing the long
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term advantages of conditionality with the short term impacts on both taxpayers and
recipients. On the one hand conditionality’s limit the choices that recipients have; on the
other hand taxpayers may be more in favor of redistributive programs with such
restrictions because they feel their money is being put to good social use. The relative
preferences of recipients and taxpayers in a particular country affect the calculation of the
legitimacy of conditionalities.
Amartya Sen: Capabilities and Freedom
Sen’s account aims to incorporate many of the arguments previously examined into
an overarching framework, arguing that just development should be considered in terms
of the actual freedoms it can achieve. Sen seeks to redefine the debate between liberty
and outcomes in terms are both be accessible and comparable. His account argues that
development should be considered in terms of the actual freedoms it can achieve. He
argues that freedom has an intrinsic and instrumental value. It is intrinsic because it can
be understood as an end in and of itself; any action that increases the freedom of an
individual agent is a good action and progressive for development. Sen makes this
argument with the claim that “political liberty and civil freedom are directly important on
their own, and do not have to be justified indirectly in terms of their effect on the
economy.”81 Freedom also has the value of increasing a person’s ability to achieve other
important outcomes, its instrumental value. By increasing an agent’s freedom, one
increases the realm of possible actions or “capabilities” that the agent has.
Sen divides his freedoms in to five categories. political freedoms, consisting of
civil and political rights which enable individuals to participate in and criticize
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government; economic freedoms, referring to an agent’s ability to engage in and
participate in economic markets using resources available, and referring to distributional
positions; social opportunities, opportunities provided by society for things that enable a
person to live a full life, for instance education and healthcare; transparency guarantee,
the assurance that agreements made under the system or by society will be honored; and
protective security, the trust that societies members will not be reduced to abject poverty
and misery.82 Each of the freedoms defined in these categories is necessary for a
complete understanding of development. They work to mutually augment the
effectiveness of each other.
Sen’s capabilities approach argues that development consists of maximizing the
substantive freedoms members of a society have reason to value. He argues these
relations can be measured by functioning and capabilities. Functionings are “the various
things a person may value doing or being,” while capabilities are “alternative
combinations of functioning that are feasible for her to achieve.83” The distinction
between these two is very important. While functions refer to a person’s actual
achievements, capabilities refer to the functioning combinations which a person can
choose.84 This implies there is an intrinsic value in having the freedom to choose the
course of one’s actions rather than having value lie solely in the most preferred element
in a choice set. It also is a more realistic definition because it takes into account the
circumstances a choice was made in. The nature of an action taken by a rich person
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necessarily refers to the alternative choices he could have made. Functioning’s and
capabilities provide the basis for a holistic conception of evaluation.
Sen’s work is particularly important for an analysis of a conditional redistribution
system. By framing questions of development in terms of functioning’s and capabilities
he allows effective comparisons of the various ways that redistributive programs and
conditionalities can affect the different elements of individual and social well-being. For
Sen conditionalities are often a justifiable element of a wealth transfer program, as they
provide a way to balance short term interests of economic freedom, with long term values
of social inclusion, political freedom, market inclusion, and long run economic freedom.
This framework will be particularly valuable when analyzing the different elements of
conditionality and redistributive frameworks.

53

Chapter III: Public Attitudes and Programmatic goals

"Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of
philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the
problems of men."--John Dewey

Introduction:

The discipline of philosophy is often criticized for dealing with abstract questions
that do not seem to have any relevance for everyday lives. While this criticism might be
true in some cases, it is not universal. In asking fundamental questions about any
position, philosophy allows us to explore the forces and underlying justifications that
drive a position, stripping it of its contextual trappings. When used in policy analysis it
allows us to identify the theoretical framework around which a particular position is
constructed. By analyzing policies this way we can gain a better understanding of the
nature of government programs, and the decision-making process which guides them.
This Chapter explores how social values are developed and transferred, and how
they can affect policymakers in order to achieve valuable outcomes. It then examines
potential designs of redistributive programs, exploring how their particularities can result
in valued outcomes. This thesis argues that since so many people have such a skewed
income position in developing countries, conditional cash transfers, if done efficiently,
effectively, and fairly, are a good thing. It adopts the normative position that the goal of
redistributive programs is to improve human dignity by striving for the shaping and
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sharing of valued outcomes. In order to do this it analyzes the potential outcomes from
redistributive programs, evaluating their implications for value systems.

Norms, Social Values, and Political Decision Making:
Political decision-making takes place within the context of a particular social
value structure governed by social norms. A program’s ability to encourage a broad
sharing of valued outcomes is partially determined by the barriers erected by social
norms. Certain shared values enable us to communicate and understand each other
effectively. Norms facilitate interaction while also constraining undesirable behavior,
meaning they can play both a proactive and protective role. Positive social norms can
increase individual wellbeing. For example, encouraging mothers to take their children
for regular checkups increases the likelihood that attending health clinics becomes a
generally practiced behavior. At the same time norms can have pernicious effects.
Negative stereotypes can cause different elements of society to be marginalized, while
improper expectations for future opportunities can cause people to make poor short term
investments.
Just as norms can facilitate social behavior they can also limit human autonomy
and well-being by restricting the way one thinks or by making a preference socially
unacceptable. Norms can create a division between the judgments and desires which are
displayed in public and those which are privately held.85 Often norms are disliked by
individuals but are adhered to because of general social pressure. In certain cases,
reactions against prevailing conditions results in segmentation of ideology within the
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individual. Norms are often extremely specific to one’s social role, and are frequently
internalized rapidly by that particular actor. Social roles and expectations can act also as
a constraint on one’s behavior. One of the goals of conditionalities is the hope that they
can result in the adoption of positive social behaviors. Thus, it is important that the
manner in which these conditions are imposed encourages this adoption rather than
causing resentment.
Norms can be identified in specific norm communities: social groups that share
similar values and beliefs. Occasionally, these communities develop their own
independent norms against the prevailing opinion. These communities also partially act
as a constraint on behavior, as the benefits they provide and punishments they exact
makes exiting them a costly proposition. Government initiated action can also result in
long-term norm shifts. They can do this by exploiting certain entrenched attitudes and
opinions in order to cause behavioral changes, or by adopting programs which strongly
convey a social value. They can also use financial resources and conditions to change the
perceived value of certain members of society. Norm cascades are successful when
prevailing opinion reaches a tipping point, where the adherence to the old norm is met
with disapproval while the new norm is met with approval.
Norms, norm shifts, and norm communication are extremely important
considerations for policy makers, especially when structuring social transfer programs.
From a purely political standpoint, norms affect the voting decisions of the populace by
defining the values by which they evaluate policies. If politicians wish to remain in
power they need to pay careful attention to the values of their populace or face defeat at
the next election. At the same time, social acceptance of a program is extremely
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important for its development. If people perceive the value of a particular policy they
will work to achieve its goals, but if they do not believe in them popular opinion can
quell progressive advancement. Policymakers need to develop programs within the
confines of prevailing political conditions, while at the same time engendering positive
change. Understanding the public’s attitude facilitates the policymaker’s ability to frame,
assess, design, and implement particular social assistance policies.86
The above sections show that norms and values are transferred in ways that can
result in desired outcomes. Redistributive programs communicate societal respect for
broad values, with the possible result of changing the associated social norm. For
example, by implementing a program that guarantees a basic minimum income, the
government signals the society’s values of affection towards the less fortunate. Specific
program design can shape the values of the recipients. Education is a good example of
how this works. The school can be a means through which the value of education is
transferred: children who go to school are explicitly taught to value an education and the
increased prospects that come with it. In the long run this process can increase the
perceived value of education and healthcare. Conditionality may be one way of
augmenting the norms associated with these values; it is important that policymakers
explore programmatic designs which incorporate effective norm entrepreneurs and that
can communicate broad social values. Incorporating community input in program design
and targeting could be one way of creating a shared norm framework.
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Public Attitudes and Policy Formation:
Prevailing norms affect social perceptions and have practical implications for
policy creation. They influence which designs and which outcomes can be practically
implemented, and inform policymakers on how to best structure a program. Much recent
scholarship has focused on the interaction between the public’s attitude and its nation’s
redistributive. Work by Shapiro and Spade found that for over a forty-year period,
changes in the public’s attitude generally preceded policy changes. (CITE) Other work
has compared differences in attitudes towards redistribution and policy outcomes in
Europe and America. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP for the US was
29.9, with only 10.6 percent of these funds going to social transfers, and 0.4 going to
subsidies. Conversely, continental Europe had an average expenditure of 44.9 percent of
GDP, with 17.6 percent of these revenues going to transfer programs and 1.5 percent
going to subsidies. In terms of purely redistributive programs, social transfers and
subsidies, the United States spends approximately half of what continental Europe does.87
Americans’ and Europeans’ beliefs about social mobility and the causes of
poverty accord with the difference in social expenditure. 71 percent of Americans believe
that the poor have good chance of escaping poverty while only 40 percent of Europeans
share this conviction. 61 percent of Americans believe individuals are poor because they
are lazy.88 In conjunction with this statistic, a higher percentage of Americans believe
that an individual’s economic position is determined by effort, while Europeans assert
that luck - the position or skills one is born with-plays a much larger role. The perception
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of greater American social mobility is not backed up by the evidence, as the United
States’ has only exhibited marginally more mobility from middle to upper middle class,
and substantially less from the lower to middle class. Despite this evidence, the
prevailing belief that American society is mobile often results in less support for
redistribution because those below the average income line believe they will be above it
someday.
The above results illustrate the powerful influence that public perceptions can
have on policy making. Numerous explanations have been given explaining this
relationship. Alesina and Glaser argue that institutional structure and racial differences
are the cause of different levels of redistribution. Piketty posits that past mobility
influences political attitudes towards future mobility, work that is supported by Corneo
and Gruner.89 Their analysis showed that “social rivalry effects” and “public values”
effects shape opinions regarding distribution, the former being perceptions of how they
view themselves relative to their neighbors, and the latter being perceptions about how
fair opportunities are distributed in society.90 Peter Lindert showed that the size of the
gap between the middle and the poor affects social spending, as the middle class feels
less affinity with the lower class. These studies demonstrate the public’s opinion about
social mobility, redistribution, and social justice, has important implications for
redistributive policies in particular countries. Safety net programs are often a balancing
act between entrenched attitudes of the citizenry and the reform desires of politicians and
international actors. It is crucial that policymakers frame programs in such a way as to
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use existing values to achieve positive outcomes, while encouraging the adoption of
positive norms.
One result which follows from the analysis above is that avenues which
communicate social values to policymakers are crucial for encouraging the transfer of
positive social values. Elections can play a critical role in this process as they are an
important avenue for expressing social attitudes and influencing the development of
policy. Democratic processes are one important mechanism for ensuring that
governments are accountable to their constituencies. In terms of demand-driven
development programs like CCTs, a responsive local political climate is particularly
important for program success. When citizens perceive an electoral environment is fair
and representative they are more likely to participate in the implementation of the
projects that the political system implements, even if they are initiated at a different level
of government. Non-competitive environments also impact elite behavior in a negative
way, leading to increased opportunities for corruption among the party.
The effects of elections are particularly pronounced in decentralized situations
where citizens feel a direct relationship with their politicians. Research done on the
implementation of PRONASOL in Mexico demonstrated that a demand-based approach
was particularly effective in a democratic political environment. Research done by
Hicksey found that more beneficial outcomes came from implementing demand based
programs in contested political environments.91 Similar results were found when
examining redistributive programs in Brazil. These examples demonstrate the critical
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role that local municipalities play in successfully implementing demand-based programs.
This discussion is particularly important for CCT programs. Incorporating the local
government can engender a feeling of responsibility for a policy, increasing the
likelihood that values will be transferred and the desired outcome achieved.
Evaluating Outcomes of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs:
The normative position of this thesis is that there are certain values we want to
enhance, and that these values are often interconnected in terms of their associated
outcomes. The goal of social policy should be to develop policies that can result in
securing shared valued outcomes. Conditionality can be a useful tool for securing
outcomes as well as affecting norms that encourage human dignity. It is particularly
effective when used to promote outcomes whose interrelated elements establish the
necessary preconditions for the enhancement of other outcomes. For example, one
requirement for political freedom is the ability to understand and engage in the political
process. Thus, promoting education can establish the preconditions for political
engagement.
At the same time it is important for policymakers to recognize that the prevailing
social environment has a direct effect on a program’s ability to achieve its desired
outcome: prevailing social norms can inhibit or undermine the effectiveness of
redistributive programs, while positive affection can increase the likelihood of its
success. Policymakers need to design conditionalities so they can draw on certain
positive norms, or erode certain norms that present obstacles.
In order to examine the implications of conditionality and redistributive policies it
is necessary to look at the particular outcomes that could result from these programs.
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While a number of frameworks could be used to differentiate these outcomes, this thesis
will draw from the work of Harold Lasswell. In Jurisprudence for a Free Society
Laswell enumerates an 8-value framework which allows one to evaluate how particular
the outcomes of a transfer program affects human dignity.
These are:

1. Well-being: the right to life, liberty, rest and leisure, and general social security
2. Skill: the right to work and to have free choice of employment as well as protection
from unemployment
3. Wealth: recognizing the right to own property, live in a standard living adequate for
well-being, and access to enough nutrition
4. Enlightenment: people have the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to
seek and impart information and ideas
5. Respect: that people are born free and equal in dignity and right
6. Power: the right to take part in government and be recognized as a person before the
law
7. Affection: the right to marry and to establish a family
8. Rectitude: freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Duties to the community and
restraints on having these freedoms destroyed by others.92

Lasswelll argues that by shaping and sharing the above values society can improve
human dignity. Shaping and sharing of valued outcomes means that all citizens ought to
participate in determining what outcomes society should be generating, that valued
outcomes ought to be expanded, and that these outcomes ought to be shared broadly,
implying a wide participation. As Lasswell and McDougal point out:

“…sharing values carries two sets of meaning, one ‘distributive’ and the other
formative. ‘Distributive’ values reference the participation in the control of value
outcome, described according to the degree of equality or inequality. ‘Sharing’
carries two sets of meaning, one ‘distributive,’ the other ‘formative.’ The
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distributive reference is to participation in the control of value outcomes,
described according to the degree of equality or inequality. The formative
meaning suggest that the amount of a given value available for sharing may be
augmented. In general we are in favor of higher levels of valued outcomes,
because we are ‘concerned about the size of the cake as well as the proportional
size of the slices.’”93

This normative position argues that, ceteris paribus, an expanding economy is an
appropriate element for a welfare program in its pursuit of human dignity. Achieving
valuable outcomes informs us that a policy was righteous and done justly: it was in
accordance with values that are substantial, meaningful, and representative. If the goal of
cash transfer systems is to promote human dignity one must examine the potential
outcomes which might result from a conditional cash transfer system, and explore how
we might value them in light of the questions raised by conditionality.
Considering valued outcomes is important for policymakers because different
programmatic designs will result in different outcomes. If this normative position is
embraced by government officials entrusted with deciding whether CCT programs should
be adopted in a specific context, and how they should be designed, then policymakers
need to determine what potential outcomes there are, and determine which ones are
valuable.
•

For each of the potential outcomes that cash transfers might provide, are these
outcomes relevant in that context, and are they outcomes desired by the officials?
o The complete list of potential outcomes is:




Improve the well-being of the poor
Increase unrestricted consumption choices
Make the poor more effective citizens
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•

Increase the poor’s participation in the market
Allow access to basic minimum economic benefits
Decrease material inequality
Fulfilling society’s obligations to share material welfare to all of its
people
Take wealth from one group and give it to another
Disengagement by upper class elements from the social process

For each of the potential outcomes that conditional cash transfers might provide, are
these outcomes relevant in that context, and are they desired by the officials?
o The complete list of potential outcomes and their associated welfare value is:










Well-being
• Improve the well-being of the poor
• Increase consumption choices subject to restriction
• Decrease material inequality
• Create disincentives for child labor
• Create incentives for school
• Promote childhood health and nutrition
• Increase the aggregate happiness of a society
Rectitude
• Provide incentives for socially desirable behavior
• Allow the interests of taxpayers to dictate consumption choices
• Fulfilling society’s obligations to share material welfare to all
of its people
• Protecting the children’s well-being against selfish parents
Power
• Making the poor more effective citizens
• Encourage democratic participation
• Encourage participation in government
• Improving the health of mothers and infants
Skill:
•
•
•
•

Promote the development of job skills
Increase the poor’s participation in the market
Improve labor mobility
Create incentives for school attendance

Respect
• Target certain demographic groups
• Fulfilling society’s obligations to share material welfare to all
of its people
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• Take wealth from one group and give it to another
Affection:
• Encourage participation in government
• Improve care of children
• Encourage community involvement
• Improve social institutions
Enlightenment:
• Create incentives for school attendance
• Provide the pre-conditions democratic participation in
government
• Improve early childhood nutrition and education

The above lists show the potential outcomes that can result from both cash transfer and
conditional cash transfer systems. For any policymaker considering implementing one of
these programs it is important to evaluate how much they value each of these outcomes,
as well as how effective the program will be. One of the advantages of imposing
conditionality is that it can result in valued outcomes that are preconditions for achieving
other valued outcomes.
The capacity to implement these positions is subject to the contextual factors in a
country: its political stability, bureaucratic and institutional framework, and its technical
capacity, as well as the current social and economic situation. Because of the long
reaching implications of CCT policies it is important to emphasize programs which use
existing positive norms in order to increase the likelihood outcomes will be adopted, or
design policies in such a way that norm and value shifts can positively alter the social
value framework.
Outcomes of redistributive program are not a zero-sum game. Limited budgets
inherently restrict different programmatic designs and force a tradeoff between different
valued outcomes. Similarly, some outcomes might result in an increase in one value at
the expense of another. For example, maximizing wealth in a country might come at the
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cost of affection: citizens spend more time at work earning income rather than being at
home with their families. While the specific values in a particular situation are always
contextual, philosophical positions and historical examples are useful guides for
examining values. Philosophy allows us to explore the values and underlying
justifications that drive a position. They enable us to question when the state is
legitimately exercising its authority in securing rights and liberties in accordance with
democratic processes. When used in policy analysis it allows us to identify the theoretical
framework around which a particular position is constructed. By analyzing policies this
way we can gain a better understanding of the nature of programs and the tradeoffs
associated with them, while also allowing us explore how we might value the relative
trade-off.
To illustrate how a policymaker might value programmatic outcomes this thesis
will now analyze the key structures and designs of CCT programs, examining the value
questions they raise. These elements will be evaluated using arguments advanced in
Chapter Two as well as historical debates. Evaluating programs this way allows policy
makers to understand the degree to which a CCT program will accord with the values
already prevalent in a society, enabling them to either design programs which will have
more legitimacy or be constructed with the goal transforming the prevailing norms so
they align with valued outcomes. This thesis specifically focuses on the following
questions:
•
•
•
•
•

should there be redistribution?
how tightly should transfers be targeted?
should they be conditional in general?
should we use conditionality to support health outcomes?
should we use conditionality to support education outcomes?
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•

who should decide the criteria for redistribution: community vs.
government?

Many of the outcomes come directly or indirectly from certain elements of CCTs, with
different structural elements resulting in an increase or decrease of a particular outcome.
It will explore these elements of CCT systems, and examine the values of their outcomes.
Redistribution:
Whether there should be redistribution, to whom, and how much is at the heart
social policy creation. Redistribution asks what right all citizens have to the wealth
produced within a nation, and to what degree are rights reserved to individuals. It also
raises the question of how responsible the state is for providing social protection to its
citizens, particularly if this debt constitutes an obligation that needs to be fulfilled. If the
goal of normative policymaking is to improve human dignity the state will have to seek
to improve individual and social welfare subject to social value considerations. The
normative justification and ability to implement these positions is necessarily depends on
the contextual factors in a county. This section is going to deal with three fundamental
elements of redistribution: should there be redistribution, should there be cash transfers,
and should there be conditional cash transfers? Each of these typologies raise questions
about different value structures, and have different advantages.
It is important to have a deep understanding of the justifications for the policy as
well as the flexibility to improve its mechanisms in order to get better long term results.
In Chapter Two we explored numerous ways of framing and justifying redistributive
frameworks. Rawls saw a guarantee of a basic minimum income as precondition for the
exercise of liberty. It is the primary job of the state to minimize inequalities and to
allocate resources so as to improve the lives of the worse-off. Similarly, Ripstein and Sen
67

argued that basic minimum welfare was required for citizens to effectively participate in
a society. For Ripstein, basic minimum income was a necessary precondition for
possessing a united will. Sen provides a method of measuring the different value
outcomes that result from implementing a redistributive program in terms of the different
vectors of freedom it opens up for its recipients. He points out that a basic level of
income is necessary for exercising economic, social, and political freedoms. In general
efficient redistributive policies improve the well-being and wealth of the least off, while
also potentially increasing affection and skills by making individuals less dependent on
employer decisions and improving labor mobility.
Considerations of the above positions need to be balanced with worries that
redistributive policies create. Redistribution decreases wealth for a substantial segment of
the population without compensation. It alters the basic property rights of the country,
making them contingent on a certain provisions of social welfare and patterned
distributions. Nozick argues these takings illegitimately impinge on an individual’s
freedom. If the taxpayers are having their money used for social welfare policies they
should have some stake in the program; they would want to see that the program leads to
long run social or economic gains. In outcome terms, it could actually decrease aggregate
economic output by putting money in less efficient parts of the economy, and could
provide disincentives to work for both the well-off and impoverished. Redistributive
policies could create a situation where one social group is dependent on another social
group. If implemented poorly these programs could create disaffection between different
social groups, increasing the likelihood that there will be shirking and inefficiencies.
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One of the implicit goals of redistributive programs is to improve democratic
participation. Conversely, Rawls holds there is an intrinsic value to self-government that
stems not from a desire for power, but comes from having “an equal voice along with
others in settling how basic social conditions are to be arranged.” The effect of these
values enhances the self-esteem of the citizen, and “raises his awareness of his own worth
developed in the smaller association of his community and is confirmed in the
constitution of the whole society” 94 Voting and holding political opinions is an activity
that informs his conception of the broader society, encouraging the development of his
intellectual capacities.

Targeting:
Targeting wealth transfers to certain populations is, at the same time, the most
logical and difficult element of a redistributive program. It incorporates a targeted
population and a targeting mechanism. The implicit logic behind targeting is that we get
more bang for our buck for targeted transfers: individuals who are in most need of a
transfer are the ones who should actually receive it. This is often grounded in the idea
that a certain minimum level of welfare is a necessary precondition for individuals to be
fully-fledged members of society. This notion is an explicit part of Rawls’, Ripstein’s,
and Sen’s arguments. For Sen, targeting is a particularly important issue. The extent of
targeting has to proceed directly from an analysis of the person’s capability deprivation
determined by examining their current functioning’s. Targeting needs to take these
holistic elements into consideration. Even Nozick notes that redistribution is necessary if
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the result of the social system would make the poorest worse off than they would have
been in the state of nature. In some respects Nozick actually takes it a step further,
arguing that targeted redistribution could be used to right past instances where unjust
deals were made. By explicitly defining a particular population and reason for
redistributive justice targeting gets to the heart of social welfare programs.
Targeting raises a host of issues regarding value outcomes. Because it
differentiates people into the deserving and the undeserving it inherently raises questions
about social segmentation and differentiation. Why should one group get a transfer over
another, and can this differentiation be justified in accordance with the prevailing or
desired social values? Groups could be targeted because they have been historically or
geographically marginalized, like Black South Africans in the BEE program, because
they are likely to be more efficient with the resources provided. This often is the
justification for giving wealth transfers to women, particularly in Bangladesh and India
For policymakers these questions are particularly salient, as targeting can easily cause
discord among their constituency, decreasing affection as well as efficiency. Individuals
who are not a part of a program may feel less inclined to support it. As a result it might
be more beneficial for policymakers to include some members of the middle class who do
not explicitly need transfers. These leakages could engender support for the programs at
the expense of decreasing its results.
There is significant evidence that self targeting increases efficiency. Because
individuals take into account their holistic status rather than simply income
characteristics, programs which employ this method get outcomes which take more
holistic concerns into consideration. In Development as Freedom, Sen details several of
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the associated problems with targeting. Information distortion occurs with programs that
attempt to determine eligibility. There is a risk of including the non-needy and excluding
some of the needy. As enumerated above, leakages could also have some potential
benefits by increasing the total number of people who are invested in a program. In many
contexts the notion that money is going to people who need it is a primary reason that
taxpayers redistributive programs. Poor targeting could erode the social value of
affection, decrease the efficacy of cash transfer programs, and possibly hurt the overall
redistribution agenda.
In addition to the above problems, poor targeting can result in incentive distortion,
the prospect of losing the benefit of a transfer could encourage people to change their
economic behavior in order to keep their benefits. Explicitly targeting certain groups
could result in transfer disutility and stigma: a system which identifies an individual as
poor risks marginalizing a recipient. This can either lead to a loss of self respect or a
decreased likelihood they will participate in the program. Administrative costs consist of
the money used in targeting and the potential social costs of asymmetrical power of the
bureaucracy, increasing the costs of corruption. Often the recipients of programs are from
marginalized political groups. As such there is a risk that political will could turn against
transfer programs, cutting them loose from the social safety net.95 It is important that
programs create a feeling of shared values across the political spectrum. For programs to
have social legitimacy they need to effectively minimize the negative costs associated
with targeting while carefully analyzing its contextual implications.
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While determining desired values is a necessary precursor for any redistributive
program, choosing an appropriate targeting mechanism is essential for efficiently
achieving effective results while minimizing distortions. Different targeting methods
have different implications for the value structure of a welfare program. As discussed in
Chapter One, the primary methods of targeting are means testing, proxy means testing,
geographic targeting, and community targeting. If there is a social consensus on the
material pre-conditions necessary for social participation, mechanisms such as the means
test and the proxy means test could be recognized as the best ways of choosing
redistributive programs. Policymakers can incorporate shared value systems into
determining eligibility criteria; these methods are often seen as the most objective, and
are often desired if impartiality is a value of the populace.
Geographic targeting can increase affection as well as labor mobility in situations
where asymmetrical growth or historic marginalization has hurt development and
inclusion. This form of targeting is particularly salient in countries with stark rural-urban
divides, where often the rural population has little or no say in governance, and very little
chance of participating in the development of the society.96 By increasing the well-being
of individuals on the geographic periphery of a society it can create a broader range of
labor and social mobility. The linkages associated with geographic targeting are
particularly striking. As entire regions of the country can be incorporated into the social
value structure, economies of scale for aggregating political, social, and economic may
be significantly increased. Sen makes the case for education as a public good: “Given the
shared communal benefits of basic education, which may transcend the gains of the
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person being educated, basic education may have a public-good component as well.”97
This public good element is augmented by geographic targeting. Moving transfers to a
previously marginalized region may increase the overall economic situation, encouraging
employers to bring businesses to the area, and helping to develop local political
institutions.
Community targeting is in many ways the most philosophically interesting
element of cash transfer programs. While one of the goals of CCTs is to engender a
feeling of belonging to the broader national community, local targeting can engender the
creation of communal values by also capitalizing on local knowledge bases to improve
outcomes. Communities can be incorporated in developing benefit levels, targeting
transferees, and evaluating programs. The effectiveness of community targeting depends
on a host of contextual factors, such as the local political structure, the culture’s beliefs
regarding social security, the size, scope, and capacities of the municipality etc.
Effectively employing community transfers in the right context can take advantages of
these different factors in order to make the program more effective. This can increase the
community’s mutual respect in conjunction with improving wealth, rectitude and
affection, increasing the likelihood the program will be successful.
Conditionality:
Conditional cash transfer programs redistribute of wealth to impoverished
members of society subject to the fulfillment of certain behavioral conditions. In general
these conditions are designed to improve the long-term well-being of recipients by
encouraging human capital development in their children. Transfers are often contingent
97

Sen, Development as Freedom, 129
73

on children enrolling and attending school, as well as being inoculated and having regular
checkups at health clinics. The cash transfer component seeks to alleviate the most
immediate and pressing concerns of poverty, while the conditions imposed seek to alter
the structural foundations of systemic poverty.98 These goods are deemed to be socially
valuable. Conditions are necessary because policymakers see that there is an
underinvestment in education and health by the poor. Because they do not value these
inputs as highly as they should the poor need an incentive attached to encourage the
consumption of a “merit good.”99
Conditioning rights on certain behaviors is an intrinsic element of any society.
Laws put down a host of conditions on certain behaviors. The right to drive in
conditioned on driving on the right side of the road, a restriction we all agree is
legitimate. While there is nothing inherently problematic about conditionality, there are
situations where unjustifiable conditions can be placed on individuals or groups that have
the effect of undermining autonomy and compromising human dignity.The goal of this
section is to explore what it is that makes a conditionality justified, and when
policymakers are justified in using it as part of a redistributive program.
The implications of imposing conditions on wealth transfers depend on the social
values which underscore redistributive systems and how conditions are implemented.
For example, in Brazil it was argued that achieving a basic minimum income was an
intrinsic right of all citizens. Conditions were imposed as a function of achieving that
condition, not as a means to coercively produce socially desirable behavior. In practical
98

Britto, Recent Trends in the Development Agenda of Latin America: An Analysis of
Conditional Cash Transfers, 20
99
Fiszbein, Schady et al, Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future
Poverty., 51
74

terms this meant that often administrators would not strictly enforce the terms of
conditionality. In fact non-compliance was regularly seen as a signal of a family needing
additional assistance, often resulting in social workers intervening directly to help the
family.100 This understanding accords with the argument which Rawls advances in A
Theory of Justice. He argues that having at least the minimum amount of primary goods
is a precondition for having fair equality of opportunity. These preconditions include
numerous linkages of background conditions--adequate housing, minimum level of
incomes, sufficient well-being etc.--of which education and adequate healthcare are but
only two elements of a larger puzzle. Thus imposing conditionality’s with the goal of
achieving the preconditions for fair equality of opportunity is a legitimate goal of
redistributive programs.
Conditionality is a conduit both for expressing and shaping normative values as
well as a mechanism for achieving socially desirable outcomes. By making wealth
transfers conditional on a certain behavior CCTs express social value for that behavior.
For example, one of the explicit social values underscoring Brazil’s Bolsa Escola
program was that having children in school was intrinsically a good thing. By attaching
conditions to wealth transfers contingent on school attendance program designers
signaled that education was positive outcome and sought to change social norms
associated so that it would be valued by recipients intrinsically. At the same time students
are taught the value of an education implicitly, learning its value through their
enlightenment.
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Conditionality: Enforcement and Paternalism
Conditions are often justified because there is a persistent underinvestment in
certain goods. This could result from the poor having a shorter time frame when making
investment decisions, or misinformation and misguided beliefs about the benefits of
investing in human capital causing suboptimal investment decisions. These beliefs are
often self-reinforcing: when an agent acts on the belief they receive the outcome they
expected, justifying their original position. For example, parents could believe that
human capital only accumulates to those who have a high level of natural talent, or that
increasing access to education will not help improve their station in society. These beliefs
are often held by parents who themselves have little or no education. When the expected
outcome occurs as a result of the decision the belief is often reinforced. Misguided
perception can come from a lack of information or difficulty in understanding the
information which is available. 101
Empirical studies have shown that misguided beliefs about expected returns to
education persist in societies, and that these misconceptions effect personal investment
decisions. This has been measured by comparing the expected returns for schooling,
reported in survey’s of students and parents, and comparing them with the actual data.
Attanasio and Kauffmann’s study found that for 15-25 year old expected returns were
smaller than actual returns for education, particularly for children’s who’s fathers did not
have education, sometimes to the degree of one third of the actual value of the return.102
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These studies empirically demonstrate that citizen’s perceptions about returns to
investments are ill-informed, possibly providing a justification for the state to impose
conditions as well as providing information in order to change how these investments are
viewed.
The manner in which conditions are enforced necessarily changes the value
associated with a program’s outcome. On the one hand conditions can be imposed, like in
the initial Brazilian case, as a method for ensuring social progress while positively
protecting the rights of the poor. This uses conditionality as a tool to encourage social
cohesion while also attempting to meet the preconditions of just interaction, but does not
necessarily see redistribution as a contingent right. Instead it encourages good behavior
and acts as a “reinforcement of basic right.”103 Operationally non-compliance is a “red
flag” which signals to administrators that a family.104 Similarly, conditions can be used
be used to protect the future rights of children of impoverished parents; expressing the
value that intergenerational equality is undeserved, and that children of the poor deserve
as best a chance as possible to be alleviated from systemic poverty. Such a model
encourages social cohesion by emphasizing affection and respect for the poor by
providing access to and encouraging use of progressive services. It also minimizes social
exclusion as it does not implicitly exclude recipients from the redistributive framework,
though lax enforcement could decrease the program’s potential aggregate outcomes.
Conditions can also be used as a paternalistic mechanism to coerce behaviors
which serve broad social ends. This could result in a coercive framework could merely
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reflect a broad paternalistic perception: the implicit assumption of conditionality is that if
it were not for the cash transfer incentive the poor would not choose to invest in human
capital formation. Society has determined what the best values that should be upheld are,
and the proper method in which they should be encouraged. Thus we can legitimately
impose conditions on your consumption because it will result in positive outcomes which
will improve your well-being. This to say such a position is a negative thing. Sen
demonstrates the linkages and tradeoffs of different elements of freedom are sometimes
necessary in order to improve the long term capabilities of the poor. Enforcing education
conditionalities in the Bolsa Escola program in Brazil has resulted in over 92 percent of
the poorest quintile being enrolled in school. Conditionalities have also created
disincentives for child labor, teen pregnancy, and truancy: absences are recorded and
segmented into justifiable and unjustifiable categories, with too many unjustifiable
absences resulting in restrictions on their cash transfer.105
Incorporative conditionalities can legitimize programs, especially if conditions are
developed which brought the poor into a discussion of “co-responsibilities.” In Brazil
conditionalities associated with the Bolsa Familia program have a 97 percent approval
from a nationally representative survey, and 98 percent approval from cash transfer
recipients. One of the reasons recipients favor the conditions so strongly is they feel they
have been involved in the process of shaping the valued outcomes which the program
seeks to achieve. Local municipalities designing programs along with federal support was
initially a key element in Brazilian CCT success. This model built municipal capacity and

105

Lindbert et al.,The Nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program: Implementing
Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context, , 63
78

created local level stakeholders who felt they had an interest in the program’s success.106
Despite these positive benefits, it is important to remember that the most impoverished
are often the least represented. Thus, local political leaders need to make a specific effort
to incorporate them when structuring the program’s design, goal, and outcomes.107
Conditionalities could also be designed and enforced in a way which alienates the
poor. This could result from legislating a framework which imposes ideals without
seeking input or encouraging local value sharing; resulting in decreased affection, feeling
socially marginalized, and decreasing the likelihood that individuals will self target and
participate in the program. By requiring that recipients perform socially desirable
behaviors CCTs reinforce the idea of a “deserving poor:” the poor deserved to get this
money because they have done well by sending their children to school and taking them
to health clinics regularly. This concept can split the poor into the category of the
deserving and the undeserving. This could engender resentment from recipients, resulting
in social isolation, loss of affection, and decreased efficiency of desired outcomes.
Administration, Centralization, and Politics:
Imposing conditionalities requires extensive oversight of the recipient’s
compliance and eligibility. As these programs have relatively complex mechanisms of
targeting and delivery transfers, they require high administrative capability while
incurring greater costs than normal transfer programs.108 While over time economies of
scale can decrease these costs, they can initially as a barrier of entry in low income
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countries, while. The contextual administrative capacities as well as the targeting
mechanism employed alter the costs of the program. Where ministerial capacities are
reasonably well established, one effective minimization strategy is to incorporate CCTs
into existing in-line activities for ministries and agencies. This strategy was employed in
both Brazil and Mexico. The success of this method depends on effectively developing
the proper mechanisms for targeting populations and monitoring compliance with
conditionalities. Institutional capacity is an important consideration when designing a
program’s structure. Central administration communicates a broad normative value for a
particular outcome to the entire society. This is particularly important if the program is
addressing the lack of a basic right.
One of the disadvantages is that, while eventually benefiting from economies of
scale, its initial start up cost is high. Particularly in developing countries there are often
disconnects between different parts of the government, resulting in inefficiencies and
wasted resources. Theses inefficiencies can result in resentment by local officials and
workers to the national agenda, decreasing programmatic outcomes. In determining a
blanket set of policies centralized systems can also limit the program’s flexibility to deal
with the particularities of a local issue. Decentralization can, in some contexts, address
some of these issues. It can increase community affection by incorporating recipients and
local officials into setting a constructive agenda, creating local investment in the
program’s outcomes.
The existing institutional framework as well as the prevailing political and social
value systems informs policymakers about the advantages and disadvantages of different
administrative structures. Social policy can be delivered in a public manner which aims
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to convey signals of normative social value for desired outcomes. In the best case
scenario norms can be transferred both by example and by encouraging good behaviors.
In Brazil, the Bolsa Escola program communicated, among other things, the value that a
well educated and informed citizenry was social good. At the same time, entrenched
social and political attitudes which are not in accordance with the desired outcome can
make reforming social policy by “stealth” a more successful strategy. This method often
involves implementing decentralized pilot programs at the local level within a particular
ministry or agency. These policies aim to increase capacities for the least well off, while
also building a wealth of experience and evidence which can be used to implement larger
scale reform efforts when the political climate is right. While not initially communicating
broad support for certain outcomes, they can communicate social values at the grassroots
levels, while laying the foundation for broader normative programs.109
Imposing and enforcing conditionalities on cash transfer changes the
administrative pre-requisites for operability, and alters the relationship between recipients
and bureaucrats. By empowering local officials to determine eligibility and benefit status
it can create incentives for leakages and corruption. The risk of corruption is particularly
high in situations where there is not a lot of administrative oversight, and where broad
social values are not shared by the program’s implementers. Empowering officials in this
way can cause resentment on the part of the recipients, making their benefits contingent
on greasing bureaucratic wheels. Resentment can decrease the likelihood that positive
behaviors will be transferred. In some situations it can cause a rift between the
community and programmatic outcomes. Iin others communities might put social
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pressure on monitors to report high levels of compliance. This is often either because of
the community’s desire to have more people in the program, or fear of the negative
consequences of losing benefits.110 One of the advantages of CCTs is that they generally
employ modern operations which decrease the likelihood of corruption. Beneficiary
selection and registration, implementing payment and monitoring, and increased
administrative oversight often decrease corruption. Additionally, CCT programs are often
implemented as part of a broader reform of social services, regularly leading to the
elimination of poorly targeted and inefficient programs.111
In some respects CCTs aim to provide a return to taxpayers, as the behavior they
reinforce both reflect social values and can result in valued outcomes. Health and
education are seen as public goods which serve their interest. Increased numbers of
educated people in a particular geographic area can have a positive impact on overall
economic growth. Facilitating a feeling of co-responsibility and incorporating taxpayer
desires in CCT designs has the advantage of increasing political and social support for the
program. Elites are more likely to favor redistribution to the deserving poor.112 This
model can be advantages in political contexts which are hostile to redistribution, as
recipients have to demonstrate they deserve certain attitudes.113 Engendering a broad
feeling of co-responsibility and designing a program so that it maximizes public
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outcomes makes CCT programs more politically stable and likely to survive a regime
change.
Education and Health:

The salient feature of most CCTs is conditioning transfers on recipient’s
participation in programs which seek to increase their or their children’s human capital.
Usually conditionalities require enrollment and attendance in school for a certain number
of days, as well as regular checkups at health clinics. They are necessary because these
public goods are underutilized by individuals in a society; children are often absent or
truant from school, and immunization rates and use of health clinics is low. Encouraging
these behaviors is particularly important as their outcomes promote an individual’s
welfare in many different ways. These conditions seek to address the root causes of
systemic poverty, encouraging the adoption of positive behaviors which will give the
impoverished the tools to improve their welfare and live a better life.
Those two outcomes are often mutually reinforcing: improving health often has
positive impacts on education, and vice versa. Work by Jalan and Ravallion showed that
improving piped water only had a positive health in households with educated mothers,
while Miguel and Kremer show how health investments can improve education.114
Recognizing that investments in child well-being are interlinked in important ways, CCTs
seek to encourage human capital accumulation at children’s earliest stages by taking
advantages of synergies between improvements in cognitive skills, behavior outcomes,
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and child health.115 Having a healthy and enlightened citizenry is often considered a
public good which society has an interest in promoting. The fact CCTs encourage the
development of public good’s is one of the reasons they have gained political popularity
in developing countries and have been able to survive regime changes.
Both health and education are interconnected with and often a precondition of
numerous other desired outcomes. The goal of these programs is to encourage positive
norms associated with these behaviors so in the long run human capital accumulates to
the poor without the need of wealth transfers to encourage positive behavior.
Additionally, programmatic structures which commit transfers to marginalized segments
of population often promote other associated benefits. For example, many programs give
transfers to the female head of households. This is often done because research has
indicated that women are more likely to spend the money on goods which improve the
well-being of the family. As of 2009, of the 31 CCTs which were in existence worldwide,
17 provided transfers to the female head of the household. An associated benefit of this
design is that it empowers the social and economic status of women, and works to change
social norms which have historically caused their marginalization. Because they often
transfer benefits directly to a recipient’s bank account, an ancillary outcome of these
programs is that they increase the poor’s incorporation in credit markets and the banking
system.116 Promoter’s of CCT program often argue that because of the interrelated
elements associated with health and education related outcomes, as well as the benefits
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which come from using wealth transfers to incorporate marginalized groups, conditioning
transfers is a justifiable practice for effective social policies.
Conditionality: Health
In many respects being healthy and free from debilitating disease and
malnourishment is the fundamental precondition for the realization of other welfare
values. The UN declaration of human rights recognizes that “everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family...”117 In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs having secure health is a primary element of
personal safety, and a necessary precursor for social and civic engagement. Poor health
plagues the impoverished in developing countries, causing malnutrition, anemia and
under-development in children. Poor health lowers the number of days the impoverished
work and their children attend school. It also increases mortality rates, fertility rates,
hurting early cognitive development and increasing the likelihood that an individual will
remain trapped in poverty. In aggregate, poor health increases the risk of epidemics
caused by communicable diseases, while decreasing economic output and causing the
poor to live a lower quality of life. Being healthy is a precondition for living a good life
and being an equitable member of society. Consequently, conditionalities associated with
health related outcomes are often established to create the just preconditions for social
interaction and individual well-being.
Health’s primacy is recognized by a number of the philosophers we have
examined. Rawls argues that, even in the thin theory of justice, it is a fundamental
primary good and would be a legitimate use of a redistributed wealth. Kant maintains
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health is a primary component of the most necessary needs which are required to
establish the background conditions for social interaction. Citizens need to have a basic
level of health care in order to stand in the right relations to one another.118 Sen regards
inadequate health as a capability handicap.119 He points out health has both intrinsic and
instrumental value: it is desired in itself and is a precondition for engaging in numerous
social and market relations.
Nozick’s argument that mandatory taxation which reaches beyond the needs of
the minimum state as well as his position that redistribution is an unjust burden on part of
society would generally place him against conditional health programs. However, his
position might change if the health outcome which the conditionality sought to address
was a result of negative externalities from legitimate transfers, and thus would not exist
in the state of nature. This could possibly be the case in situations where pollution
resulting from legitimate transfers was the cause of health problems.
Conditionalities associated with healthcare seek to address these underlying
concerns by using preventative care to improve children’s long term health prospects as
well as helping their cognitive development. The goal is to improve the immediate and
long term well-being for the poor while instilling a positive behavioral norm for regularly
attending health clinics. Conditionalities generally take the form of regular checkups,
childhood growth and development monitoring, and compliance with immunization
coverage. Progress in improved nutritional status is measured by increases in childhood
height and weight, while progress in cognitive development can be measured in
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improvements in language development, gross and fine motor skills, personal behavioral
skills, and incidence of behavior problems.
Recent studies by Macours, Schady, and Vakis have demonstrated that the
Atencion in Crisis program in Nicaragua resulted in improved development in language
and behavioral skills. These benefits are particularly robust when children are enrolled in
the program before they enter school. Their results also demonstrated spillover effects, as
improvement in these outcomes were found in children who were not the target of the
program.120 These results are important because they demonstrate both the powerful
cognitive outcomes which can result from improvement in childhood nutrition, but also
show the power of changing normative values of a particular behavior. Work by Strauss
and Thomas has also found that improving healthcare increase the long term wage
prospects for adult Brazilian’s. Body mass index, nutrient intakes, and height were found
to be powerful predictors of wages in the urban market. While this data focuses on adults,
it demonstrates the crucial point that health related outcomes are directly linked to future
earning potential. These studies show how conditionalities associated with health can
practically improve the immediate well-being and development of its recipients, as well
as improving their long term earning potential.
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Education:
While being healthy and reasonably well fed are vital components for living a
minimal existence, being educated is often an essential component for full social
inclusion. The 26th article of the UN declaration of human rights affirms the “right to a
free and compulsory education with the goal of strengthening human rights and
fundamental freedom.”121 This right is particularly affirmed at the primary education
level. Unfortunately global enrollment rates don’t reflect this right.As of 2009, over 15
countries had over 25 percent of their children out of primary education, while statistics
on secondary enrollment were significantly worse.122
Low enrollment rates and poor attendance often results from the parent’s belief
that education is not a worthwhile investment, and that their children’s efforts are best
used in contributing to the household’s income. Ferreira has formalized a model which
explains individual welfare in terms of consumption during two periods of life: childhood
as well as adulthood. Children can contribute to household’s resources during their
childhood by spending some of their time working, but this time is spent at the expense
of studying or being in school. Their contribution can come in the form of working on the
family’s farm, helping out with household duties, or being employed in wage labor.
Current consumption from childhood labor often comes at the expense of adulthood
consumption, as expected future consumption diminishes with decreased skill levels.123
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Placing conditional incentives on education aims to change the investment choice made
by parents regarding their children’s allocation of time.
The interrelated values which education provides is recognized and explicated by
a number of the thinkers which have been examined. Rawls found education and
enlightenment as a good which transcends economic efficiency and social welfare
considerations. Education is a necessary requirement for an individual to enjoy the
culture of his society, take part in its affairs, and secure the sense of his own worth. In
Sen’s terminology this is education’s intrinsic value. Its instrumental value is broad and
far reaching: it allows people to feel a part of the member of society, improving social
values of rectitude and respect, while providing them with the critical thinking skills
necessary for improving one’s economic status.
Ripstein, as well as Rawls and Sen, focuses the way improving education
increases the skill set of an individual, improving their long term economic prospects,
while also increasing their ability to engage with other elements of society. In terms of
increasing political freedom, the state has an interest in publicly funding education
because it establishes the legitimate preconditions for public lawgiving and private
interaction based on the rightful conditions. An educated population is partially protected
against poverty, and publicly funded universal education is an investment against future
dependence. Civic education also lays the preconditions for establishing the rightful
condition allowing one to stand by their rights against private persons and the state.124 It
is also justified because only an educated population can legitimately give laws to itself
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in accordance with the original contract. 125 This is not to say that education will
necessarily result in reflective voters, but it is a precondition for having reflective voters.
Education facilitates the expansion of political freedoms, and could be construed
as a prerequisite for the state to legitimately legislate laws. Imposing conditionality on
education is often justified because of the numerous interrelated instrumental benefits
which accrue from human capital development as well as the intrinsic benefits which
come from being educated. Additionally, incorporating marginalized social groups into
the programs benefit structure, like attaching cash transfers to female children’s
attendance on school. Chapter V will take an in-depth look at conditionality and
education policy in Brazil.
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Chapter IV: The Spectrum of Conditionality
Introduction:
Chapter One explored the structural foundations of CCTs, examining the different
potential programmatic designs and delivery mechanisms. Chapters two and three
explicated different systems of valuation, explored how values are transmitted in society,
and examined how different structural designs of CCTs can affect desired outcomes. This
Chapter draws on the above discussions to define a framework that can be used by
policymakers seeking to establish a CCT program. Using the philosophical positions
previously explicated, it will examine what background conditions justify a CCTs, and
which conditionalities are appropriate depending on the . This section seeks to establish a
continuum of conditionality, from the position which is least open to conditions, the
argument advanced by Nozick, to the one which is most open to conditions, the utilitarian
position. It will locate where on this continuum each of the philosophers stands, and
examine the relative strengths and tradeoffs of the particular position. The framework in
this section will provide guidance for policymakers adhering to one or more
philosophical positions by specifying the conditions which would justify CCTs and the
program designs which best succeed in upholding its values.
Robert Nozick: The Primacy of Liberty
The libertarian position advanced by Robert Nozick frames one side of the
continuum. His argument establishes individual liberty as paramount, a consideration
which cannot be subsumed for a greater social good.126 He argues there are natural rights
to property and freedom of action which precede and cause the development of the state
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through the invisible hand process. Restrictions on action come in the form of side
constraints, prohibitions on one’s actions violating the rights of others in the pursuit of
his goal.127 Individual liberty is protected to the extent that no new rights emerge at the
group level which are beyond the preexisting individual ones. Since liberty is all but
absolute, his position precludes paternalistic restrictions on liberty legislated by the state;
allowing that a person may “choose or permit another to do to himself anything, unless he
has already made some obligation to a third party.”128 This ultimate protection of liberty
allows an individual to make choices which are detrimental to their health or wellbeing if
they so choose.
For Nozick, a distribution is just if it arose from another just distribution by
legitimate means, in accordance with the principle of acquisition. The only time an
individual can lay claim on another is if a person’s transactions causes harm to a third
party such that it would violate the minimum conditions established by the proviso. The
state’s function is to provide general protection for transactions, and enforce the principle
of rectification when illegitimate transactions occur.
Asserting the priority of liberty and the principle of justice in acquisition leaves
very little room for redistribution and conditionality. If one adheres to his libertarian
roots, the only time when redistributions are justified is when they are necessary to
permit a baseline distribution of wealth required to satisfy the minimum conditions of the
proviso. Nozick argues the principle of acquisition shadows transfer, and in cases where
transfers violate the terms of the proviso or when they are necessary to compensate for
historical redress, then conditions based redistribution would be justified. Policymakers
127
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seeking to maximize individual liberty in accordance with a Nozickian framework of
rights need to contextually examine both the historical record of transactions which led to
the current distribution and current transactions to ensure they do not result in a net loss
of individual liberty.129 This would require an extensive knowledge what the conditions
of poverty are in a particular country, as well as the historical processes which led to the
current state. In situations where state centered redistribution must occur, conditions
associated with wealth transfers would be justified, provided they increased the speed by
which the economic condition of the least well off is improved.
Adhering to Nozick’s strict libertarian framework may result in situations where
the rich are getting less of a return for their money by paying for protective services
instead of simply redistributing wealth. For example, there could be a scenario where the
poor are highly disruptive to other members of the economy to the degree that it is
necessary for the state to use its policing services in order to allow transactions, but the
poor are not below the minimal baseline conditions. In this case, it may be possible that
redistribution to the poor would cost less than paying for policing activities. A strict
interpretation would say that this form of redistribution is illegitimate. 130 If liberty is
truly a priority, then the state can take actions to limit their disruptions, but it cannot force
redistribution from one group to another in order to establish the environment for secure
transactions.
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This is not to say redistribution cannot be a privately contracted arrangement.
Nozick would be in favor of voluntary redistributive programs where the wealthy
transferred money along with conditions with the implicit understanding that the poor
would improve their standing in exchange for the transfers. Similarly, community level
transactions where all members mutually agree on redistributive policy could be a
legitimate framework for redistribution. These structures are within the domain of private
transactions, and are not a consideration for the state. Nozick’s argument establishes the
primary position liberties have, and sets a strict criterion for situations where
redistribution would be legitimate.
Rawls: Justice as Fairness
Like Nozick, Rawls asserts the primary place that rights and liberties have in an
analysis of justice. However, unlike Nozick, Rawls argues there are certain fundamental
rights, enumerated by the two principles of justice, which set preconditions for the
exercise of rights and liberties. It establishes the right to a certain minimum income, as
well as fair equality of opportunity and institutional guarantees of fundamental liberties.
This process sets the framework for social cooperation, which is the foundation for
productive activity.131 Justice as fairness is determined by an index of primary goods: the
things needed over the course of their lives by citizens fulfilling the political conception
of persons and operating as cooperative members of society. Primary goods include basic
rights and liberties, the freedom of movement and free choice in occupation, power and
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority, a level of income and wealth, and the
social basis of self respect. Rawls argues that citizens’ needs are sufficiently comparable
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for the index of primary goods to serve as a suitable and fair basis of interpersonal
comparison. The principles of justice assess the basic structure in accordance with how it
“regulates citizens’ shares of primary goods” 132
Conditionalities are justified when the background institutional structure of preprocedural justice has not been met or when inequality of opportunity is precluded. The
framework he establishes recognizes the lexical priority of the principles of justice, and
allows for tradeoffs in order to establish the just preconditions for social cooperation.
This caveat is particularly interesting: while Rawls recognizes fundamental rights to
wealth and income, he acknowledges that securing these rights is conditional on securing
equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is comprised of a set of interrelated
factors, such as safe housing, basic health and education, which Rawls highlights as a
fundamental primary good necessary for a citizen to engage in social cooperation. The
value of education and healthcare comes from the need for citizens to participate in the
legislative stage. Health care restores citizens so they can be functional members of
society, while education gives them the tools to exercise their political freedoms. The
value of a minimal income inequality in accordance with the difference principle is
contingent on securing equality of opportunity.
His account requires the establishment of the basic structures of the background
institutions of justice so that citizens have the ability to train their capabilities and a fair
opportunity to make use of them. “It is left to citizens as free and equal persons, secure in
their basic rights and liberties and able to take charge of their own life, to avail
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themselves of the opportunities guaranteed to all on a fair basis.”133 Providing basic
capabilities they are able to function as free and equal citizens and have fair equality of
opportunity, but that once these pre-conditions have been met it is up to the citizens to act
on their liberties and individual preferences as they see fit.134

While Rawls is similar to

Nozick in that he upholds individual liberty and preferences, he recognizes these liberties
are preconditioned on basic institutions and equality of opportunity. Conditionalities are a
legitimate goal for achieving these ends because they operate as a means of establishing
an expectation of primary goods which facilitates equality of opportunity and establishes
a just institutional structure. While they may not be sufficient to guarantee full equality of
opportunity, their focus on health and education makes them a highly effective tool
establishing a crucial element of the just preconditions.
Rawls’ position is particularly useful for policymakers who appeal to fundamental
rights or the idea of social debt as justifications for redistributive policies. It provides a
framework for them to analyze the structures which uphold basic rights, while also
justifying conditionalities which address them. In order to create appropriate
conditionalities, a contextual understanding of the existing distribution of primary goods
is of paramount importance. To determine the legitimacy of CCTs policymakers need to
examine the current institutional framework, particularly the level of incorporation of the
most disadvantaged in the political and legal system, as well as the extent of health and
educational services. Social norms of exclusion of particular demographic groups, for
example the marginalization of women, need to be incorporated into benefit structures.
Because Rawls is particularly concerned about maximizing social cooperation,
133
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incorporating the community the development and implementation of conditions is
crucial for achieving successful outcomes. 135
Ripstein: The Benefits and Constraints of the Rightful Condition
Ripstein occupies an integral place on the conditionality continuum. He provides
a justification for social provisions based on the necessity of establishing the rightful
conditions for social interaction and forming a united will, while simultaneously using
these same principles to create an upper bound on providing conditions-based support.
This framework allows him to concurrently justify legitimate rights which are necessary
background conditions for the exercise of liberty while restricting the state’s interference
in individual lives. Ripstein’s argument hinges on two elements: the necessity of having a
united will for just political authority, and the implications of establishing the rightful
conditions for equitable social interaction. His argument allows for tradeoffs when
implementing conditionality, provided that background conditions have not been met.
Ripstein argues that a government can only have public authority if it is
accountable to the people. Because “people cannot give itself laws which its members
could not consent,”136 legislating laws on oneself requires a united will of the populace.
Further, as was discussed in Chapter Two, one can only have effective accountability if
one has people who are educated, healthy, and capable of being politically engaged.
While Kant upholds the right of individual freedom, he argues this freedom is contingent
on securing the rightful background conditions. Establishing the rightful conditions
requires health, a basic level of education, and a capacity for political and social
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engagement. Imposing conditionalities secures the preconditions for the exercise of
freedom.
For Ripstein, achieving certain background conditions are necessary for the
exercise of freedom, one of which is the freedom from being entirely subject to the
choice of another. Therefore, unlike Nozick who argues individual liberties are absolute
to the point where one could sell oneself into slavery if he wanted to, such a decision
would violate the background conditions of individual freedom and thus would be void.
Interestingly, what entitles one to be a chooser, his status as a free being, also limits the
extent to which redistribution can occur. Once the legitimate conditions of independence
are secured, the private right to choose how best to live one’s life in accordance with ones
preferences takes over. Any further conditionality’s would be a violation of one’s
individual freedom. For example, after a provision for basic health care is established, it
is discovered that leading a vegetarian lifestyle improves the wellbeing of citizens.
Imposing this restriction on individual behavior would be illegitimate, even if it results in
a better outcome for the individual, because it would be a violation of individual freedom.
Because freedom is contingent on establishing the right preconditions, Ripstein’s
argument allows for trade-offs between different provisions which establish the
background conditions prior to their realization. Such trade-offs would generally be
justified if they could bring an individual closer to fulfilling his most basic necessary
needs. However, once the background conditions are established, any trade off with
individual liberty would be illegitimate.
Ripstein’s argument establishes an upper bound on legitimate conditionalities
which can be imposed by the state. So doing, he creates a clear bright-line which
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policymakers can use to delineate legitimate conditionality programs. It is clear that
conditionality programs are desirable if they can secure the education and health related
outcomes which establish the background conditions for freedom. They are particularly
useful if they can promote social incorporation and political understanding, both of which
are necessary for both the rightful conditions and establishing a united will. Whether such
a program is necessary or not depends on the contextual factors in a society. Whether the
poor are already fully participating citizens in the social and democratic process makes a
difference to the desirability of conditionality programs. Similarly, current institutional
capacity for providing basic health services and the scope of education alter the
framework of the program’s design, and change its target audience. The state also has a
duty to guarantee formal equality of opportunity.137 The extent to which this exists within
a society and in what areas it is lacking will dictate the particulars of the program. The
degree to which these programs redistribute is restricted by the upper limit. Thus it is
particularly important that CCTs have an effectively designed exit system to graduate
recipients from the program once the background conditions of freedom have been met.
Amartya Sen: Trade-Offs and Freedom

As was enumerated in Chapter II, Amartya Sen argues that development should
be understood in terms of the actual freedoms, separated into five categories, a policy
achieved. These freedoms are measured in terms of increased individual capabilities.
Because poverty consists in capability deprivation, overcoming poverty requires
improvements in the capabilities the poor have. Sen argues for a continuum of
enhancement of capabilities or freedoms, whose interconnected nature naturally
137
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augments one another as they expand. societal terms interpersonal comparisons of
capabilities require an “aggregation over heterogeneous components,” meaning there is a
distinct social element in determining the value of a particular freedom. Additionally, the
capability perspective has the advantage over the human capital perspective by allowing
one to value the particular means an individual uses to achieve a particular goal, not just a
desired end.138
In terms of conditionality, Sen would argue that CCTs would be desirable if they
can accomplish an increase in the real freedom for a society. Therefore, he is in a unique
position to support the enhancement of programs which most effectively expand
capabilities, even if they come at the expense of trading off with other capabilities in the
short term. Sen is able to make tradeoffs between restrictions on some kinds of freedoms
in order to achieve a greater outcome in another kind of freedom which, to varying
degrees, Rawls, Nozick, and Ripstein are unable to. He is unburdened by their normative
frameworks. In certain important ways Sen is a consequentialist. By looking at the
aggregate freedoms of a particular program he is assuming an outcome based approach.
At the same time he acknowledges there are certain intrinsic and instrumental advantages
to freedom; for example, education increases one’s enlightenment, skill set, ability to
participate socially, and the potential for political freedoms. Further, he acknowledges
that it is not justifiable to sacrifice certain values for other desirable outcomes. For
example, one cannot completely sacrifice political freedoms for economic opportunities:
what would be the point of being rich if one lost all political freedom? Some of these
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outcomes are intrinsically valuable, such as increased enlightenment, while others, such
as increased political potential, are instrumentally valuable.
Evaluating conditionality in a freedom framework necessarily depends on the
existing capabilities in a particular society, the intrapersonal valuation of capabilities, and
the interpersonal conception of valued outcomes. The advantage Sen gives to
policymakers is a framework through which one can effectively evaluate and weigh the
different potential outcomes of a particular program. Given the fundamental intrinsic and
instrumental value Sen places on health and education, programs which emphasize
increasing these capabilities are likely to be supported by this framework.
Acknowledging the interconnected elements of many of the basic freedoms, it is quite
likely that an increase in one capability, such as education, will eventually result in
improving other capabilities, like market participation. Thus, programs need to take into
account the short term and long term benefits of their outcomes. Freedom is additionally
beneficial because it takes incorporates the decision making process as well as the valued
outcomes, implying that participation in value sharing and political decision making has
an intrinsic worth. This model also allows one to examine the potential opportunities
which an individual might achieve, in addition to the potential outcomes of an action.139
Conditionality programs are justified when they address the contextual capability
deprivation in a society by using redistribution and conditions to increase freedoms. For
these programs to achieve their desired outcomes it is crucial that policymakers are aware
of the current level of capability deprivation in society. Thus it is important to whether
the poor are fully participating citizens, in a political, economic, and social context.
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Knowledge of the extent and reach of education and health care, as well as the social
values surrounding these programs, would also be critical information. Fundamentally, it
is important to know the relative intrapersonal and normative interpersonal valuation
which is placed on particular freedoms, as these will inform both the degree of the tradeoff which would result from a program and the effectiveness of a particular policy. One
advantage of an interconnected freedoms view is that policymakers can design programs
such that they address numerous concerns in one fell swoop. Say for example women
have been historically marginalized, and health and education for families is poor.
Adopting a program which postulated that expanding women’s education is the best way
to increase women’s and children’s health, and that the program would give grants only if
family’s sent their daughters to school, would address many of these interconnected
concerns. Nevertheless, while enabling a contextual valuation of constituent freedoms
and relevant tradeoffs because Sen. Regards certain values as fundamental, he does not
completely disregard the normative framework adhered to by Rawls and Nozick.
Utilitarianism: Ultimate Conditionality

Because the essence of utilitarianism is that, “the moral worth of an action is to be
judged by the effect of promoting happiness—surplus of pleasure over pain”—
aggregated across all inhabitants of society,”140 The theory postulates that only outcomes
matter, normative policies should be evaluated by how much they promote welfare in
society. Utility can be measured in numerous ways, for example some recent work has
tried to attach a utility weighted utility to individuals receiving or providing wealth
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transfers depending on their socioeconomic status, but in general utilitarian evaluate a
policy by aggregating the utility in a society
Simply put conditionality’s are justifiable if they increase the aggregate welfare in
a society, and are not if they do not. Because it does not adhere to any a priori value
structure, the significant elements of a program are solely determined by how much
utility is achieved with an outcome. Provided an improvement in the aggregate is
increased, utilitarianism allows for any conditionality, resulting in extreme tradeoffs of
liberties for welfare. Utilitarianism is thus almost the polar opposite of the view advanced
by Nozick, providing no fundamental guarantee of right in the face of redistributive
programs. This is not to say that utility is deals solely with economic activities, social
interaction and marriages deal in areas where pure monetary transactions rarely exist. 141
Further, as Posner points out, if a particular outcome could be wealth maximizing it could
justify numerous restrictive conditions. The implicit disadvantage of working through a
utilitarian framework is that one comes across numerous outcomes which seem morally
suspect explicitly corrupt. Nevertheless, in allowing a trade off of any rights
utilitarianism provides the challenge to the other philosophers to justify that they have the
better framework.
While it is unlikely that a policymaker follows a strictly utilitarian line of
thinking, consequentialist frameworks are often used to evaluate the outcomes of a social
policy. Any conditions and conditionalities would be justified provided the outcome
increased aggregate utility. In operating under a conditional framework policymakers
need to know the societies utility functions, how it values different elements, and how a
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policies outcomes might shift the social norms which determine the weight of a valuation.
Policymakers also have to determine how they are discounting utility in the future versus
utility today; as the restriction on freedom of action for the recipients of wealth transfers
could cause relative disutility. In general, because the outcomes of CCTs general target
those who will receive the highest marginal utility from the benefit, outcomes will result
in a higher aggregate utility, particularly if human capital accumulation increases the long
term earning potential for a society. They also need to determine whether they are
operating on a traditional aggregate utility framework, or a nuanced marginal utility
metric. If one applies a nuanced metric a greater amount of conditional redistribution
will be justified, as the marginal utility to the rich will be subsumed by the marginal
utility to the poor, and the conditions associated with the wealth transfer will decrease the
disutility for the payee.142 Because classic utilitarianism operates at the far side of the
conditionalities continuum it is unlikely a poor model will be used by policymakers.
Nevertheless, evaluating a redistributive framework through a utilitarian perspective can
be useful because it throws all the cards on the table and allows one to see all the
potential tradeoffs which could occur with a particular policy.
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Chapter V: Analyzing the Evolution of Social Policy in Brazil:

Philosophical positions are not discussed in a vacuum; their premises are debated
by policymakers every day. This discussion is particularly evident when developing
conditions based wealth transfers. The development of redistributive policies and CCTs
in Brazil is a fascinating example of how shifting policy frameworks and social values
informed and shaped a country’s social welfare system. The debate in Brazil drew
heavily on the idea that, because of previous inequality and marginalization, there was a
social debt owed to society’s poor. Many segments of society argued there was a right to
a basic minimum income, level of education, and access to health services. These ideas
are strikingly similar to the position Rawls advances regarding the background conditions
necessary for exercising fundamental liberties, though many of the justifications also
accord with other philosophical positions. Because of the visible discussion of social
values and policy design, Brazil is an ideal case for examining how philosophical
viewpoints can both inform policymaking and be used to evaluate a particular program.
Explicitly enumerating and critically analyzing this process in Brazil is an instructive
exercise for policymakers who are seeking to construct policies in their own country.
Between the 1930’s and 1970’s the oligarchic and then dictatorial federalist
government implemented a social welfare system which was both centralized and
focused on issues associated with the country’s rapid urbanization. While the model
which emerged from this process was relatively large in scope, increasing the
institutional scope of education, health, social welfare, and public housing policies, these
programs were mainly targeted to the workers who paid into the system. The social
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system was highly centralized at the federal executive level.143 The most visible program
was the Brazilian League for Social Assistance (LBA), which was created in the
1940’s.144 The pattern of social protection was a system which was selective in
determining beneficiaries, heterogeneous in determining benefits, and fragmented both
institutionally and finically.145 As a result of focusing on issues associated with
urbanization, its policies were primarily designed as a social safety net for workers.
Despite expressing a high value for social safety nets, as is evidenced by a 62 percent
increase in social expenditures during this period, institutional inefficiencies and poor
targeting resulted in massive inequalities and social exclusion: the Gini coefficient rose
from 0.58 in 1980 to 0.64 in 1989.146 Minimum incomes and welfare policies for nonworkers were either poorly addressed or ignored entirely, and many peoples, particularly
in rural areas, slipped through the cracks.
As democratic principles and liberalization began to influence the country’s
politics in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s grassroots organization began to transform the
social agenda. Middle class and union organizations, particularly the Central Workers
Union and General Workers Union, began to express demands for expansion of rights
and social policies. These movements expressed “new collective identities” of their
“corporate interests.”147 Their impact was augmented by increasing awareness of
iniquitous development in the country, and their presence sparked a national debate
national values which would define Brazil’s new constitution.
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Confrontations in the early 1980’s defined the social issue on the democratic
agenda, particularly the debate between an employment based economic development
strategy advanced by the conservatives—arguing for stabilization policies which would
boost employment and increases in salaries, and the social policy reforms advocated by
new political forces. 148,149 The new agenda included calls for:
1. Immediate action to alleviate poverty which would be concentrated on
the most poor and indigent parts of the population
2. Improved levels of efficiency and redistribution for social expenditure
programs, incorporating significant changes in their financing
structure.
3. A reform of the parameters of social protection using a criteria which
was more socially just in terms of equality and equity
4. Administrative reform of the institutions responsible for social
policies, correcting for distortions and support issues. 150
These positions framed the evolving discussion of social policy reform. During the mid
1980’s Brazil underwent a major transformation, as the centralized authoritarian
government transitioned to a decentralized framework, with greater emphasis on
municipality incorporation and participation in policymaking. The dynamic shift in social
value structures is particularly evident in the debate about the new constitution.
A powerful notion which emerged from this debate was the idea that during the
authoritarian regimes’ rule society had accrued a “social debt” to its citizens which had
been marginalized. The discussion coalesced around what obligations the social debt
created, and which policies were necessary to fulfill these demands
Ratified in 1988, the constitution institutionalized a number of the principles
enumerated above. It emphasized the need for reducing poverty and creating a just and
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equitable society.151 The constitution established a legal foundation for social protection
as a guaranteed right of the needy, and created an obligation for the state to provide
health and education services as a basic right to all citizens. It weakened contributions as
a structural component of the system, and provided for the universalization of access and
an expansion of coverage. It also redefined minimum levels of value in terms of social
benefits, gave a commitment by the state for elevated levels of social good and services,
and guaranteed the irreducibility of benefit values. It decentralized the institutional
apparatus and emphasized community participation, both of which allowed greater
amounts of social participation and local input. 152 The new constitution generally moved
the country from a meritocratic-particularistic model of redistribution towards social
democratic redistributive model.153
Protecting these elements as a fundamental right created an obligation for society
to provide them to the poor, while potentially limiting the restrictions which can be
placed on the poor’s ability to act as they wished. They are justified as a precondition for
living in society and constituted an historical obligation. The constitutional guarantees,
particularly the minimum benefit level and guarantee of basic health and well-being, set
certain minimum conditions which were seen as rights of citizenship.154 Even though the
provision for basic rights was enshrined in its founding document, it was not necessarily
the case that health and education services were actually available to the poor. Thus it
became the task of policymakers to develop systems which were capable of addressing
the institutional gap. During this period legislative reforms attempted to keep up with the
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constitutional ones. For example, the Cruzado Plan, introduce in 1986, increased the
minimum wage and social security plans by 15 percent while removing the contributory
element in social programs.
In 1991 Senator Eduardo Suplicy introduced a national minimum income
program, the Programa de Garantia de Renda Minima, which a used negative income tax
on workers over the age of 25 who earned twice the minimum wage, the established
poverty line. In order to combat a labor disincentive the program indexed benefit levels to
30 percent of the difference between the individual’s income and the minim wage. 155
This program was important in that it was the first to be both benefit informal workers
and target the poorest families. Its universal reach broke with the “clientalist feature of
the Brazilian social policy,” 156 while its explicit goal of fighting inequality was a
significant break from previous political practice. While the program mainly focused on
poverty alleviation, ignoring many of the structural elements of poverty, it was an
important signal from the national government about a significant change in the country’s
social value structure.
Taking up the idea that structural and immediate causes of poverty need to be
addressed through social policies, local municipalities began to develop cash transfer
programs which would create incentives for improving human capital as well as fulfill
the constitutional obligation to address poverty. These programs accompanied a
significant decentralization of tax revenue to states and municipalities, increasing by 13
percent and 30 percent respectively in 1993. 157 Programs emerged as a result of two
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fundamental ideas formed during the constitutional debate. The first was the idea that the
poor had a right to a basic minimum income, while the second argued that poverty
reduction strategies needed to address structural conditions of poverty, in addition to
symptomatic ones. Education in particular was seen as a crucial tool for breaking the
intergenerational cycle of poverty, but policymakers recognized the need to provide
financial support in order to maintain attendance of the poorest students.158
Emerging from these basic principles, the Bolsa Escola Program was started in
the Brasila and Campinas municipalities in 1995 by Governor Buarque and Mayor
Teixeira respectively.159 Following their initial success, many municipalities adopted
their own BEPs based on the original model. The number of municipalities with BEPs
increased from six at the end of 1995 to fifty-eight by 1999. While each program was
contextually designed in order to address local concerns, they broadly shared six uniform
elements. They established a minimum income threshold for eligibility, either ½ or ¼ of
the minimum wage or a threshold between $35 and $60. They required recipients to have
school age children, usually between the ages of 7 and 14, though others expanded the
age bracket. BEPs generally had a two year residency requirement for eligibility, though
there was a range between one and five years. A large number of the programs also
targeted transfers to the female head of the household.160 The programs allowed benefits
as long as recipients remained eligible, and established conditions of a minimum
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attendance record for transfers, though some also incorporated scholastic performance
and extra-curricular participation.161
The Bolsa Escola Program is particularly interesting in that it received broad
support from across the political spectrum. “its unusual combination of left-wing and
liberal positions” …”was reflected in the diversity of political actors who supported the
program.”162 This support reflected a national consensus among elites that the country’s
problems were a result of “low levels of schooling and health care and high levels of
poverty and inequality.”163 One of the primary reasons CCTs have been so successful is
policymakers have been able to design programs which broadly share values with
numerous members of society.
Following the initial popularity and success of the program the federal
government began to provide co-financing for municipalities in 1998. This was initially
done through the Minimum Income Guarantee Program (PRGM) which was
implemented in 1998. PRGM provided 50 percent co financing to municipalities who
were implementing CCT programs. This was essential in promoting and maintaining
municipal CCT programs. 164
Notwithstanding the success of municipal BEPs, their increasing popularity called
for greater national coordination. This was driven by large variations in coverage, ranging
from 6.5 percent to 45 percent of the eligible families, and the fact that the poorest
municipalities which were in greatest need of the BEP program but had the fewest
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resources to pay for them: CCTs in the poorer north accounted between 11.5 and 19.2
percent of the governments revenue, while the wealthier South paid between 0.2 and 3.6
percent of their revenue on BEP.165 In response to these worries, and capitalizing on a
favorable political climate, President Cardoso implemented the National Bolsa Familia
Program (NBEP) in 2001. This increased the amount of resources available for transfers
up to $680 million, though this represented 0.7 percent of federal social expenditure.166
The NBEP changed existing BEPs by implementing uniform “designs and
parameters,”167 establishing common eligibility criteria, thresholds, benefits, and
conditionalities among all municipalities. It also changed the programs’ funding
structure, establishing federal municipal partnerships where the federal government
“designed, coordinated, and financed” benefits, while municipalities were responsible for
implementing the programs. The federal government also directly executed transfers
using electronic cards to transfer money to recipients. 168
Following the success of the NBEEP program the federal government
implemented a number of other CCT programs targeting different demand side issues for
the poor. These included the Bolsa Alimentacao program in 2001, which aimed to reduce
infant mortality and nutritional deficiency by targeting transfers to families with young
children conditional on complying with health care visits, growth monitoring, and
nutritional education seminars. Additionally, the Auxiliio Gas (2002) and Fome Zero
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(2003) programs transferred money in order to reduce transportation costs and the risk of
extreme poverty for the poor. 169
In 2003 the government launched the Bolsa Familia program. Over its first four
years the program consolidated and integrated federal CCTs under one overarching
framework. It aimed to promote efficiency by reducing administrative costs, improving
the system for identifying a target population, advancing the synergies between health
and education, improving monitoring and evaluation, and promoting vertical integration
in order to take advantage of complementarities between national and sub national
programs.170 The program provided transfer values which favored the extreme poor,
families with children, and which was simple to administer. It provided simple and
variable benefits, with the former going to all poor families, and the later going to
families with children, though with benefit levels capped at three.
The average benefit for families ranged between $7-45, which was higher than the
average benefit pr-reform. At the same time the program encouraged cooperation
between federal programs and municipal CCTs.171 It did this by vertically integrating
BFP jointly with municipal programs, by establishing minimum standards for program
operation, and by providing performance based financial incentive along with targeted
training, capacity building, and monitoring. These strategies enabled the BFP program to
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draw on the benefits of local municipality engagement, while expressing national values
for desired outcomes. 172
Evaluating Brazil’s Social Policy:
As the previous section demonstrates, the evolution of social policy in Brazil both
directly reflected and sought to share positive social norms and valued outcomes. Brazil’s
social policy was largely based on a belief in a social debt to the historically marginalized
poor, as well as a conviction that all citizens had intrinsic rights to minimal levels of
income, basic healthcare, and education. These principles were formally adopted in the
constitutional reform of 1988. Throughout the reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s they
became widely adopted values, something which was reflected in the broad support
conditionality programs received from all sides of the political spectrum. The targeted
populations as well as the conditionalities associated with the Bolsa Escola Program, as
well as subsequent CCTs, explicitly aimed to fulfill society’s debt by providing the
minimum basic conditions entitled by citizenship. They also aimed to incorporate
community values and promote social inclusion in order to integrate the poor into the
social and political structure. Its decentralized structure promoted community and local
political engagement in its outcomes, as well as enabling the development of contextual
solutions for local problems.
Brazil’s CCT programs have been successful in part because of widely shared
beliefs in its underlying values, as well as the efficiency its vertical integration and local
engagement has achieved. Because the social policy debate in Brazil has so explicitly
engaged social values and valued outcomes, it is an ideal case for using the continuum
172
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developed in Chapter to analyze social policy and value structures. This section is going
to use the ordered continuum to analyze how different philosophical positions inform us
about the debate regarding conditionality, and the outcomes and tradeoffs of particular
program designs. Though this analysis is by no means complete, it serves as an example
of how a policymaker can use different philosophical frameworks to evaluate
redistributive policies and conditionality.
A Nozickean, evaluating the Brazilian experience through a libertarian
framework, would likely conclude that, like most redistributive programs, the Brazilian
CCT does not constitute legitimate transfers of wealth from the rich to the poor. Even
though there was gross inequality, it is difficult to make the case that the impoverished
have dropped below the minimum conditions which require redistribution. Broad
political support does not justify the program either, because redistribution would
constitute illegitimate takings from the wealthy members of society who do not support
the program, not to mention it would overstep the bounds of the minimal state.
While broad social redistribution may not be justified, the idea of a social debt
may make some redistribution legitimate. In particular, it is possible that indigenous
populations would be entitled to rectitude because historically illegitimate transfers
robbed them of their natural endowments. Similarly, it is possible that the principle of
rectitude could come into play if the authoritarian state used its power to force
illegitimate transfers on the underprivileged. If the principle of rectitude is applied, a
Nozickean would not argue for a government sponsored CCT program, instead opting for
a direct cash transfer equivalent to the welfare loss of their foregone endowment.
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Many of the outcomes and underlying values which are prevalent in the Brazilian
redistribution program are strikingly similar to arguments made by John Rawls. A
Rawlsian would agree with the assertion that a minimum income, a basic level of
healthcare, and access to education are necessary for establishing the preconditions for
the principles of justice. He would agree with the worry about high levels of inequality,
arguing that inequality which does not meet the maxi-min principle should be
redistributed. Similarly, the program sought to establish equality of opportunity for the
impoverished to participate in social, economic and political institutions, a goal which is
in accordance with part one of the second principle of justice.
The evolution of the Bolsa Escola program directly accords with a Rawlsian value
structure: its decentralized municipal roots allowed the program to incorporate
community members, promoting social inclusion, community building, and social
cooperation. The eventual adoption of a national program under the NBEP is in
accordance with the broad social value structure which Rawls argues must be adopted on
a national basis, and helps to fulfill the difference principle on a national level. Increased
oversight and efficiency also helps to establish just institutions which provide equality of
opportunity. Conditionalities focused on human capital development are justified because
the programs are targeted to marginalized individuals, who have not yet met the
background conditions for the first or second principle of justice,
A Ripsteinian neo-Kantian analysis of the Brazilian social policy debate would
focus on the historical and current level of political exclusion, as well as the progress
towards establishing the rightful conditions of social interaction. In particular, the notion
of a social debt owed to the poor because of previous political marginalization directly
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accords with Ripstein’s position that a united will is necessary for self legislation.
Because the poor were excluded from the previous political regime, distributions in order
to establish the rightful conditions for a united will is necessary for the government to be
legitimate. The idea of fundamental rights of citizens directly accords with the concept of
a necessary baseline for establishing the rightful condition. Emphasizing education and
health is an effective means of achieving political participation, while also being a
legitimate use of state action in order to establish the rightful conditions.
Conditionalities are justified because the rightful condition necessary for
autonomy has not yet been established. Decentralization and incorporating local elements
in developing and designing programmatic structures and outcomes facilitates local
political participation, and is a step towards achieving political legitimacy. The uniform
support these programs have from multiple levels of the political and socio-economic
spectrum is an important step in establishing a united will among the citizenry. The
uniformity established with the NBEP is on the one hand beneficial, because it ensures
that a greater number of people will receive transfers capable of establishing the rightful
conditions, but on the other hand it limits local cohesion, as some municipal autonomy is
rescinded. A true valuation depends on the contextual social and demographic
characteristics in a particular community in question.
A freedoms based approach would be in favor of many of the program’s goals and
outcomes. The program primarily targeted the development of political, social and
economic freedoms. In establishing a minimum level of welfare the program endeavored
to create the minimum conditions for economic and social inclusion. Its decentralized
targeting mechanisms and use of conditionality promoted a feeling of shared interest in
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its outcomes. This is reflected in the universal political support the program has received,
which decreases the potential for social marginalization. Local participation also enabled
the development of appropriate outcomes designed in accordance with contextual
valuations of capabilities. The program’s method of human capital accumulation
addresses capabilities which have both intrinsic and instrumental value. These freedoms
are reinforced by its political and social elements. The NBEP, when implemented,
provided some guarantee of transparency, equity, and efficiency, which in turn
encouraged a feeling of social cohesion and support for the program. Conditionalities
would be justified, as the small restriction on economic freedom results in increases in
short run social freedom and physical well-being, along with long run increases in
economic, social, and political freedoms.
A utilitarian analysis of the Brazilian CCT debate would focus on the society’s
aggregate levels of welfare at different stages in the program’s development. In one
respect this simplifies the matter, as particular design features can be analyzed on a
consequentialist basis, adjusting for unexpected outcomes. It is likely that the broad
feeling of a debt to the poor combined with a higher marginal utility for transfers, and
increasing returns which come from conditionality, would justify the implementation of
extensive redistributive policies. Additionally, it is likely that the increased aggregate
amount of wealth transfer under the NBEP combined with increased efficiency which
resulted from adopting uniform standards would lead a utilitarian to support
redistribution at the federal level. At the same time, community targeting could enable
wealth transfers to go to those individuals who most need, meaning one would get a
higher marginal utility for a particular transfer. Thus, the utilitarian position on
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centralization depends on the contextual factors which determine what utility outcomes
result from different arrangements.
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Conclusion:
This thesis sought to develop a framework which policymakers can use to
analyze conditional cash transfer programs in accordance with a particular value
structure. Adopting the normative position that there are certain values interconnected
with outcomes which we want to embrace, it has analyzed whether different
philosophical positions would argue that CCTs are justified. This exercise has revealed,
depending on the philosophical position embraced, a policymaker may oppose or
completely endorse CCTs for a number of reasons. These different positions would also
dictate not just whether you are going to have CCTs or not, but also how they are going
to be designed and what the nature of the conditionalities will be.
In order to effectively compare the implications of different value systems it
developed a continuum which can be used to evaluate the trade-offs of conditionality.
This framework was employed in Chapter V to analyze the debate about and evolution of
conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil. These exercise showed how different
philosophical frameworks could be employed to evaluate conditionality in a particular
context. Additionally, this thesis has argued that social norms and shared value structures
play a pivotal role in effective use of conditionality requires an understanding of the
relevant social norms, entitlements, and their interconnectedness. With this knowledge in
hand, it has examined how different CCT design structures can use contextual factors to
promote human dignity in accordance with a particular value structure.
While much of this thesis has focused on analyzing philosophical frameworks, it
has argued that these positions have direct implications on policy creation. As the case
study of Brazil demonstrated, different philosophical positions are constantly used as
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justifications in debates over CCTs. In order to fully analyze the implications of a CCT
program, it is important to make the philosophical underpinnings more explicit. This will
allow everyone to be able to fully understand what the trade-offs are. Only with this fuller
understanding can we properly design and implement effective and appropriate CCT
programs capable of promoting human dignity.
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